GENEVIEVE D. WAGNER, APPELLANT,
v.
RUTH F. WILLIS, APPELLEE
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Plaintiff Wagner appeals a summary judgment finding her contributorily negligent for proceeding through a green traffic light without looking, even though the defendant ran a red light. The court reversed, holding that contributory negligence is a question of fact for the jury, not law for the trial judge.
The question of contributory negligence is a jury question, not a matter of law to be determined by the court. A driver lawfully proceeding through a green light has the right to assume other drivers will obey traffic laws and may proceed without first looking, unless she becomes aware of impending danger and has a clear opportunity to avoid it.
“The operator of a motor vehicle who proceeds in compliance with the law has a right to assume that others will obey the law and exercise due care to avoid an accident.”
Establishes the legal principle that drivers following traffic laws need not anticipate violations by others
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWagner was driving west on First Avenue North in St. Petersburg and stopped at a red light at the intersection with 66th Street. When the light turned…
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Plaintiff-appellant, Genevieve D. Wagner, takes this appeal from a final judgment wherein she was held guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in the lower court’s order granting defendant-appellee’s motion for summary judgment.
The facts in the case before this court are simple. Plaintiff was headed west on First Avenue North in St. Petersburg, Florida. She drove up to its intersection with 66th Street and stopped for a red light. When the light changed to green and without looking left or right, she proceeded into the intersection where she first noticed defendant’s car, which had run a red light, coming in front of her. Plaintiff attempted to avoid the collision, but failed.
Since plaintiff-appellant’s testimony must be taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff in this appeal, the above stated facts must be deemed controlling. Warring v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 105 So.2d 915 (Fla.App.1958).
Upon these facts, the lower court found that even though the plaintiff had the green light she was contributorily negligent as a matter of law in that she did not exercise reasonable care to determine that no impending danger existed.
The question of whether or not the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence under these facts is strictly an issue which must be determined by a jury.
The operator of a motor vehicle who proceeds in compliance with the law has a right to assume that others will obey the law and exercise due care to avoid an accident. Kerr v. Caraway, Fla.1955, 78 So.2d 571. Thus, plaintiff had the right to assume that the defendant would stop at the stop light since plaintiff had the right-of-way. It would not be contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff to act on such assumption in proceeding into the intersection unless and until she became aware of the fact that defendant was going to run the red light and unless she then had a clear opportunity to act in such emergency so as to avoid the collision after the emergency arose. Kerr v. Caraway, supra. See also St. Germain v. Carpenter, 84 So.2d 556 (Fla.1956); Colerick v. United States, 77 F.Supp. 953 (Fla.1948); and Robbins v. Grace, 103 So.2d 658 (Fla.App.1958).
The facts, considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, come directly within the framework of the above-stated principle of law. Plaintiff had the green light at the intersection and had a right to assume that the defendant would stop at the red light. Plaintiff was not put on notice of *675defendant’s failure to yield the right-of-way until defendant’s car was immediately in front of her. This was insufficient time to have avoided the collision.
The trial judge erred in ruling that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
However, a jury may find under these circumstances that the plaintiff was contrib-utorily negligent.
For the reasons herein stated, the order of the lower court should be and hereby is reversed and the cause is remanded for jury trial.
Reversed and remanded.
LILES, C. J., and ALLEN, J., concur.
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U. S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. & Phillip Hurlock, 362 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)…intersection with a favorable traffic signal has the right to assume that others will obey the law and yield the right-of-way to him. Kerr v. Caraway, 78 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 1955); MacNeill v. Neal, 253 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971); Wagner v. Willis, 208 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968). However, it is equally true that a motorist who proceeds into an intersection must also use reasonable care. As we said in MacNeill v. Neal, supra, at 264: A motorist about to enter an intersection with the traffic signal in his…
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Ellsworth R. MacNEILL & Guardian-Union Grp. of Ins. Cos. v. Neal, 253 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971)…intersection. Tackett v. Hartack, supra. He has not exercised reasonable care once he knows or should have known that another motorist is going to run a red light and he has a clear opportunity to avoid the collision. Wagner v. Willis (Fla.App.1968) 208 So. 2d 673. Therefore, the issue in this case is whether or not there is any evidence, directly or inferentially, to suggest that the appellee did not exercise reasonable care in entering the intersection. The evidence is quite clear in the instant case that…
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Gonzalez v. Rose, 752 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)…wis, 331 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). We do not believe that the appellants have met their burden under this standard. Although the appellant’s proposed jury instruction number 15 may have been an accurate statement of law, see Wagner v. Willis, 208 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968), it nevertheless was inapplicable and was not supported by the facts of this case. Without dispute, neither Gonzalez nor Rose had a green light at the intersection as stated in the proposed instruction at the time of Gonzalez’s le…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- City OF Miami v. Lager, 105 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958)
- Alonzo v. Robbins, 103 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)
- Kerr v. Caraway, 78 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 1955)
- Louise ST. Germain and her husband v. Carpenter, 84 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 1956)