FRED CARVER, APPELLANT,
v.
BILLIE MAE JENKINS, APPELLEE
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Carver appeals a jury verdict in a personal injury case, challenging the trial court's responses to jury questions and other evidentiary and procedural rulings. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, finding no reversible error in the court's jury instructions or evidentiary decisions.
The trial court committed no reversible error. The court's answers to jury questions through re-reading the negligence and contributory negligence charges and providing clarifying comments were proper attempts to simplify the issues. The refusal to allow defense counsel to discuss legal effects of evidence was proper because questions of law are for the court and questions of fact for the jury. The ordinance was properly admitted as relevant to the plaintiff's theory.
“Questions of law are for the court to decide; questions of fact are for the jury to decide.”
Establishes the proper division of authority in jury trials and justifies the trial court's refusal to allow defense counsel to discuss legal effects of evidence in summation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCarver was the defendant in a personal injury action tried before a jury. After retiring to deliberate, the jury submitted questions to the court rega…
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The appellant was the defendant in the trial court. He appeals a final judgment based upon a jury verdict in a personal injury action. His main ..contention is the court committed reversible error in answering two questions which the jury asked after being instructed and retiring to consider their verdict. After receiving the questions the court afforded counsel a full opportunity to discuss the proper method of answering the jury. Appellant’s position before the trial court was:
“MR. HAWKESWORTH: I am not asking, Judge, or suggesting that you answer either question, directly ‘Yes’ or ‘No’, but merely that you believe that by an explanation of the verdict forms that the question submitted will be answered. ‘If you still have a question after I have instructed you as to the use of the verdict forms, we will take it up.’ ”
*883The court answered the jury by informing them that the questions were difficult to answer under the Rules of Procedure and that he had determined that the only proper way to answer them would be to read to them again the court’s charges on negligence and contributory negligence and then add a few words of his own in attempting simplification. The court’s charges on negligence and contributory negligence were proper, and the rereading of these charges in no way prejudiced the defendant-appellant. Zanetti v. Weissler, Fla.App. 1965, 179 So.2d 383. We have carefully considered the additional comments by the court, and we find that they were an entirely proper attempt to clarify the situation for the jury in the event that they should find both parties negligent. Appellant has failed to demonstrate error upon the court’s answer to the jury’s questions.1
Appellant has presented two additional points. The first urges that the court should have allowed defense counsel in summation to discuss the legal effect of certain evidence upon which appellant’s counsel had not sought an instruction. The refusal to allow the comment was not error under these circumstances. Questions of law are for the court to decide; questions of fact are for the jury to decide. Piowaty v. Regional Agricultural Credit Corp., 160 Fla. 136, 34 So.2d 94, 1 A.L.R.2d 705 (1948).
Appellant’s last point urges that the court erred in permitting an ordinance to be read into evidence. He urges that the ordinance was not applicable to the situation presented by the evidence. The ordinance introduced was relevant to plaintiff’s theory of the case and therefore was properly to be considered by the jury. Allen v. Hooper, 126 Fla. 458, 171 So. 513 (1936); Ahrens v. Hayworth, Fla.App.1966, 189 So.2d 163.
No error having been demonstrated upon the trial of the cause, the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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Schiffman v. Powell Sys., Inc., 246 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)…dard Jury Instructions 4.8. We have examined the plaintiff’s second point on appeal and find it to be without merit. See Medina v. McAllister, Fla.1967, 202 So. 2d 755; Warmuth v. Greenberg, Fla.1951, 49 So. 2d 793; Carver v. Jenkins, Fla.App.1968, 209 So. 2d 882; and Zanetti v. Weissler, Fla.App.1965, 179 So. 2d 383. In addition, we note that no objection was made in the trial court to this point which is argued on appeal. Cf. Advance Company v. Albert, Fla.App.1969, 216 So. 2d 474. Plaintiff’s third point…
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Cevallos v. Mercury Ins. Co. of Fla. (9th Cir. Ct. App. Div. 2007)…judgment is a tool used by the courts, on proper motion, to resolve matters between parties where there are no disputed questions of material fact. Florida courts have long held that legal questions are the province of the judge. Carver v. Jenkins, 209 So. 2d 882, 883 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968) (citing Piowaty v. Regional Agricultural Credit Corp., 160 Fla. 136 (1948)). When no factual questions remain, summary judgment can effectively resolve a conflict. See Copeland v. Florida New Investments Corp., 905 So. 2d 979…
Authorities Cited
- Allen v. Hooper, 126 Fla. 458 (Fla. 1936)
- Angeline Ahrens v. Hayworth, 189 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)
- Zanetti v. Weissler, 179 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)
- Piowaty v. Reg'l Agric. Credit Corp. of Wash., 160 Fla. 136 (Fla. 1948)