THE HOME INSURANCE COMPANY, A NEW YORK CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
EDWIN P. DRESCHER, ALVIN C. TERRILL, EDRE ENTERPRISES, INC., AND PHOENIX ASSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK, APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1968-05-14
No. 67-847
Before PEARSON, BARKDULL .and HENDRY, JJ.
210 So. 2d 451 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1968) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

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Holding

The court held that the insurer failed to sustain its burden of proof to void the automobile liability policy, and any ambiguity in the application is resolved against the company.


Facts & Procedural History

The appellant insurer sought to void a policy based on an unanswered question regarding automobile ownership on the application. Although title was ve…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant, plaintiff in the trial court, seeks review of an adverse final decree in a declaratory decree action.

The appellant attempted to void an automobile liability policy pursuant to the provisions of § 627.01081, Fla.Stat., F.S.A. The trial judge found that the appellant had failed to sustain its burden of proof to void the policy; that the defendant, Edwin P. Drescher, was the “equitable and beneficial owner of the insured vehicle”. The problem arose because the following question was contained on the application for insurance:

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(a) If all automobiles are not (a) solely owned by the Applicant, (b) principally garaged at the Applicant’s address, or (c) operated by residents of the Applicant’s household, explain:”
* 4c * * *

No answer was given. Although title to the automobile was vested in a corporation, it is apparent from the record that the defendant, Drescher, was the sole owner of the automobile and these facts were known to the solicitor or agent for the company. Phenix Ins. Co. v. Hilliard, 59 Fla. 590, 52 So. 799; Royal Ins. Co. v. Smith, 158 Fla. 472, 29 So.2d 244; 18 Fla.Jur., Insurance, § 205.

Therefore, we find no error in the degree under review and affirm, Poole v. *452Travelers Ins. Co., 130 Fla. 806, 179 So. 138; Russell v. Eckert, Fla.App.1967, 195 So.2d 617; 18 Fla.Jur., Insurance, § 245. If, in addition to the above question, the company desired to know how title to the automobile was registered, such a question could have been contained on the application. Any ambiguity in the application is resolved against the company. Boston Insurance Company v. Smith, Fla.App.1963, 149 So. 2d 68; New Amsterdam Casualty Company v. Addison, Fla.App.1964, 169 So.2d 877; Miller Electric Company of Florida v. Employers’ Liability Assurance Corporation, Fla.App.1965, 171 So.2d 40.

The final decree here under review is hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By

  • …ld be drivers of the insured automobile, which is the interpretation placed on the question, according to Mrs. Gaskins, by the agency’s employee. Any ambiguity in the application is to be resolved against the insurer. Home Insurance Co. v. Drescher, 210 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1968). We further agree with appellants that an issue is presented concerning whether the insurance agency was acting as agent for appellee in this transaction. Section 626.746(1), Florida Statutes (1977), provides in part that no ins…
  • State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mallard, 548 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
    …nsured and strictly against the insurer. Gaskins v. General Insurance Company of Florida, 397 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Moore v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Company, 277 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); Home Insurance Company v. Drescher, 210 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968). Where the meaning of the insurer’s language is doubtful, uncertain or ambiguous, the doubt is resolved in favor of greater coverage. Joseph Uram Jewelers, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 273 So. 2d at 113. It is w…
  • Kozerowitz v. A. J. Stack & the Fla. Real Est. Comm'n, 219 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
    …coverage with respect to the hazard resulting in the loss, if the true facts had been made known to the insurer as required either by the application for the policy or contract or otherwise.” And see Home Insurance Company v. Drescher, Fla.App.1968, 210 So. 2d 451. The substance of the allegations of the second count was that the appellant was guilty of a violation of § 475.25(1) (d) Fla. Stat., F.S.A., for having operated as a real estate salesman during the period between expiration of his annual certifica…

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