KRUEGER

v.

ILLINOIS

Citator

Cited By (30 total)

• Cannady v. State, 427 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1983)
  …82 Ill.2d 305, 45 Ill.Dec. 186, 412 N.E. 2d 537 (1980) (defendant’s remark variously described as “Maybe I ought to have an attorney,” “Maybe I need a lawyer,” and “Maybe I ought to talk to an attorney,” was not a request for counsel), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1019, 101 S.Ct. 3009, 69 L.Ed.2d 390 (1981). See also State v. Johnson, 318 N.W. 2d 417 (Iowa), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 106, 74 L.Ed.2d 95 (1982). In this case the context in which appellant said he thought he should call his lawyer made it im…
• Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (U.S. 1984)
  …e right to counsel need not be explicit, unequivocal, or made with unmistakable clarity,” but not “every reference to an attorney, no matter how vague, indecisive or ambiguous, should constitute an invocation of the right to counsel”), cert. denied, 451 U. S. 1019 (1981). Still others have adopted a third approach, holding that when an accused makes an equivocal statement that “arguably” can be construed as a request for counsel, all interrogation must immediately cease except for narrow questions designed…
• Gilmere v. City OF Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1985)
  …very purpose of causing harm. Id. at 1033. The predecessor to this circuit has adopted the Johnson v. Glick factors as the guiding standard for substantive due process claims, see Williams v. Kelley, 624 F. 2d 695, 697 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1019, 101 S.Ct. 3009, 69 L.Ed.2d 391 (1981); Hamilton v. Chaffin, 506 F. 2d 904, 909 (5th Cir.1975). Cf. Tolbert v. Bragan, 451 F. 2d 1020 (5th Cir.1971). The court below properly cited the Johnson factors in addressing the plaintiffs substantive due pr…

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