KIMMEL

v.

INDIANA

Citator

Cited By

• Rev. Roy Jones v. The City OF Lubbock, 727 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1984)
  …r.), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 917, 101 S.Ct. 3151, 69 L.Ed.2d 999 (1981). Nevertheless, a civil statute may require or proscribe conduct so vaguely that it violates due process, Exxon Corp. v. Busbee, 644 F. 2d 1030, 1033 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 932, 102 S.Ct. 430, 70 L.Ed.2d 239 (1982), although such a challenge contemplates a less exacting standard of review. E.g., id. at 1033. In A.B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 267 U.S. 233, 45 S.Ct. 295, 69 L.Ed. 589 (1925), the Supreme Court…
• The Reserve, Ltd. v. Town OF Longboat KEY, 17 F.3d 1374 (11th Cir. 1994)
  …ommercial regulation, such as section 150.34(B), is unconstitutionally vague on its face, we must determine whether the section is “substantially incomprehensible.” See Exxon Corp. v. Busbee, 644 F. 2d 1030, 1033 (5th Cir. Unit B May), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 932, 102 S.Ct. 430, 70 L.Ed.2d 239 (1981); Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 749 F. 2d 663, 668-69 (11th Cir.1984). That is, in order to be unconstitutionally vague the section must be “ ‘so vague and indefinite as really to be no rule or standar…
• Woodruff v. United States Dep't OF Labor, 954 F.2d 634 (11th Cir. 1992)
  …99, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1193, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982). The test is whether the enactment is substantially incomprehensible. Exxon Corp. v. Busbee, 644 F. 2d 1030, 1033 (5th Cir. May 1981), cert. den., Exxon Corp. v. Georgia Assn. of Petroleum Retailers, 454 U.S. 932, 102 S.Ct. 430, 70 L.Ed.2d 239 (1981). Here, Woodruff was employed by the United States Army. He was injured on property that was owned by his employer. Although “premises” may be read both more expansively and more narrowly, it is a sufficiently…