FLORENCE RIESNER
v.
LEO RIESNER
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Florence Riesner appealed from a divorce decree that granted her ex-husband Leo Riesner a divorce on his counterclaim, awarded him child support obligations, and denied her request for alimony. The Florida Supreme Court addressed her application for suit money and alimony, ultimately awarding her only appellate solicitor's fees and costs rather than the ongoing support she sought.
The court awarded Florence $200 in solicitor's fees and costs for the appeal to be paid by Leo, but did not award her ongoing alimony. The court emphasized that because Florence was the movant in the lower court (rather than being forced into court by her husband's original suit), she was not in the position of a wife entitled to alimony support.
“The record shows that the appellant was the movant in the court below when she filed there a suit for divorce.”
Establishes that Florence initiated the divorce action as the moving party, which proved dispositive to the court's analysis of her entitlement to support.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFlorence Riesner filed for divorce as the moving party in the trial court. Leo Riesner filed an answer and counterclaim for divorce. The trial court f…
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This case is before us on application for suit money and alimony. The petition was referred to the Honorable Paul Barns, to make findings of fact as to the faculties of the parties. His report has' been submitted to *763the Court and has been considered in connection with the record in the cause.
The record shows that the appellant was the movant in the court below when she filed there a suit for divorce. The appellee was defendant there and filed answer and counterclaim, praying for divorce. The final decree held that there were equities to be considered in 'both the bill of complaint and the counterclaim, but that the equities are in favor of the defendant on his' counterclaim and that he is entitled to a divorce from the complainant. So the decree granted the divorce and required the appellee to pay to the appellant the sum of $40.00 per week for the support and care of her minor son, custody of whom was awarded to her, and required appellant to pay the sum of $750.00 solicitor’s fees and court costs and awarded to appellant certain personal property.
The report as to the faculties of the parties made by the " Honorable Paul Barns, Circuit Judge, is' that appellee is worth approximately $25,000.00; that appellant has received since the final decree the sum of $1,680.00 from appellee in addition to attorney’s fees and costs; that appellant has received $1,460.00 as rents from property given to her by the appellee; that appellant has paid about $50.00 on mortgage on the property and that the amortization payments due on the mortgage amount to $110.00 per month, which includes principal, interest and taxes'; that at the present time, appellant has on hand the approximate sum of $100.00 out of $3,140.00 received by her since the entry of the final decree which was on November 9, 1936.
All matters considered, the judgment of this Court that the appellant, being the movant in the court below, is not in position of a wife who has been forced into court by an original suit brought by the husband, but is entitled to and *764is hereby awarded the sum of $200.00 solicitor’s fees and the costs of making up transcript of record incident to the; appeal here and the filing fee required to be paid in this Court, all of which shall be paid by the appellee.
So ordered.
Ellis, C. J., and Terrell and Buford, J. J., concur.
Whitfield, P. J., and Brown and Chapman, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
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Boyer v. Boyer, 588 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)…believe that the appeal will be successful.” Phifer v. Phifer, 124 Fla. 223, 168 So. 9 (1936). Such awards have been granted in other Florida Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., Graves v. Graves, 138 Fla. 589, 189 So. 871 (1939) and Riesner v. Riesner, 129 Fla. 762, 176 So. 765 (1937). In Horn v. Horn, 73 So. 2d 905 (Fla.1954), the court held that the trial court had no power to enter an order requiring the payment of fees and costs in connection with an appeal, but specifically stated: “If necessity existed f…1 / 2
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Miller v. Miller, 586 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)…in the appellate court was soon discarded. In Graves v. Graves, 138 Fla. 589, 189 So. 871 (1939), the court remanded the cause to the circuit court to make the determination concerning the amount of cost and fee awards. See also Riesner v. Riesner, 129 Fla. 762, 176 So. 765 (1937). But, the appellate court retained the power and discretion to decide whether the impecunious appellant had made a sufficient showing of [*1318] merit and good faith. See Troeger v. Troeger, 127 Fla. 53, 172 So. 473 (1937). Howev…
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Riesner v. Riesner, 151 Fla. 8 (Fla. 1942)…of whom, by a previous order, had been awarded to Florence Riesner simultaneously with the granting of a divorce, and the weekly payments were made to her under the terms of the decree. The case comes here for the third time. See Riesner v. Riesner, 129 Fla. 762, 176 So. 765; Riesner v. Riesner,. 136 Fla. 129, 186 So. 669. Hearings were had before the chancellor on a rule to show cause and testimony of the parties was taken, and after hearing all the testimony it was the conclusion of the chancellor that b…