TOM ADAMS, AS SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
FRANK SUTTON, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, APPELLEES
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The Florida Supreme Court reversed a circuit court's invalidation of a statute prohibiting political contributions by liquor licensees, holding that the statute's amendment providing exceptions for fraternal and social organizations was constitutional and based on reasonable classifications.
The statute is constitutional. The Court held that the amendment's exception for fraternal, social, and cultural organizations provides a reasonable classification based on the different purposes these organizations serve with beverage licenses, and the regulation of the alcoholic beverage business is a proper legislative function.
“the regulation and control of the alcoholic beverage business is peculiarly a legislative function. In this connection, as in all similar situations, when the legislative branch of the government exercises a legislative power in the form of a duly enacted statute or ordinance it is not the function of a court to explore the wisdom or advisability of the enactment in order to bring its enforceability into question.”
Establishes the deference courts must give to legislative regulation of alcoholic beverages
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFlorida Statute § 99.161(1)(b) prohibited persons holding liquor licenses and their affiliates from making political contributions, with an exception …
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Appellant in this case controverts a declaratory decree of the circuit court holding the following statute invalid under Sec. 1, 13, or 15, Decl. of Rights, Sec. 1, Art. VI, Fla.Const., F.S.A., or Amend. 14, U.S.Const.
“(b) No person holding a license for the sale of intoxicating beverages, nor any member of an unincorporated association holding such a license, nor any officer or director of a corporation holding such a license, shall make, directly or indirectly, any contribution of any nature to any political party or to any candidate for nomination for, or election to, any political office in the state; provided however that these prohibitions shall not apply to members of country clubs, fraternal, social, and cultural organizations.” (e.s) F.S. Sec. 99.161(1) (b), F.S.A..
The decree states :
“The contention of the Plaintiff is that the subsection under attack is unconstitutional in that no reasonable classification exists. The Court concludes that notwithstanding the fact that the constitutionality of Section 99.161, Florida Statutes, as written prior to 1965 was upheld in Smith v. Ervin [Fla.], 64 So.2d 166, the amendment added by the 1965 session of the Legislature is unconstitutional for the reasons as contended by the Plaintiff * * * Subsection (1) (b) of Section 99.161, Florida Statutes, 1965, is declared null, void and inoperative.”
This statute, prohibiting political contributions by liquor licensees, was designed to apply both to individual licensees and to those affiliated with group licensees, either unincorporated associations or corporate license holders. The amendment condemned by the decree in this case provides “these prohibitions shall not apply to members of” certain organizations of a fraternal nature. This language, in our opinion, simply excludes those organizations from- the group licensees covered by the act, and prevents application of its prohibitions against contributions on the basis of affiliation with such licensees. We do not overlook the contention that the amendment might be literally construed, out of context, to provide that members of fraternal, social and cultural organizations shall be excluded from the prohibition against contributions, regardless of their status otherwise as individual or affiliate liquor licensees. Certainly this result was not intended and does not follow from our construction of the proviso, which by “these prohibitions” refers to prohibitions against contributions by affiliates of organization licensees.
Thus construed, we think the amendment must be regarded as based on inherent distinctions between the specified organizations and others for which beverage licenses might serve a different purpose. We are presented with no evidence, argument or authority which would negate the existence of a reasonable relationship between the purpose of the act and the classes excluded. So far as plaintiff based his attack on alleged discrimination between liquor licensees and other business endeavors, the situation is one governed by principles well stated in an earlier opinion of this Court recognizing that:
“* * * the regulation and control of the alcoholic beverage business is peculiarly a legislative function. In this *3connection, as in all similar situations, when the legislative branch of the government exercises a legislative power in the form of a duly enacted statute or ordinance it is not the function of a court to explore the wisdom or advisability of the enactment in order to bring its enforceability into question. To this end the limits of the court’s authority is to measure the validity of the legislative enactment by the requirements of the controlling law. If those standards are met the legislation should be upheld.” State ex rel. Eichenbaum v. Cochran, Fla., 114 So.2d 797, 800.
The Florida Constitution, Sec. 26 of Article 3, requires that laws be passed to prevent all undue influence from improper practice in the conduct of elections. Our decisions recognize that “what is an ‘improper practice’ is for the Legislature to ascertain and prohibit under adequate penalties, within the reasonable limitations implied in the exercise of all expressly stated legislative powers.” 1
The decree is accordingly reversed and the cause remanded for disposition in accordance with this opinion.
THOMAS, ROBERTS, ERVIN and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
THORNAL, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.
CALDWELL, C. J., concurs in opinion by THORNAL, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I would strike from the statute the italicized proviso quoted in the opinion by Justice Drew. The legislature might have intended what the opinion assumes but it certainly did not so state. I fear that the opinion merely supplies a judicial assumption of legislative intent, contrary to the expressed language of the enactment. The proviso, I think, is unconstitutional. I would strike it and permit the remainder of the statute to stand. I concur in part and dissent in part.
CALDWELL, C. J., concurs.
THORNAL, Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I would strike from the statute the italicized proviso quoted in the opinion by Justice Drew. The legislature might have intended what the opinion assumes but it certainly did not so state. I fear that the opinion merely supplies a judicial assumption of legislative intent, contrary to the expressed language of the enactment. The proviso, I think, is unconstitutional. I would strike it and permit the remainder of the statute to stand. I concur in part and dissent in part.
CALDWELL, C. J., concurs.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Lieberman v. Marshall, 236 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1970)…rty of speech in specific situations may be required to yield to valid state or local interests springing from public necessity. Smith v. Ervin, 64 So. 2d 166 (Fla.1953) ; State ex rel. Nicholas v. Headley, 48 So. 2d 80 (Fla.1950) ; Adams v. Sutton, 212 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1968); Ex Parte Hawthorne, 156 So. 619 (Fla.1934); Satan Fraternity et al. v. Board of Public Instruction for Dade County et al., 156 Fla. 222, 22 So. 2d 892 (1945); Oshins v. York, 150 Fla. 690, 8 So. 2d 670 (1942); Jones v. Board of Control,…
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Coleman Stewart and Maria Stewart v. Green, 300 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1974)…specified business and others, and where there can be no evidence presented which could negate the existence of a reasonable relationship between the purpose of the act and the class included, it must be found to be constitutional. Adams v. Sutton, 212 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1968), App. dismissed 393 U.S. 404, 89 S.Ct. 681, 21 L.Ed.2d 630, reh. den. 393 U.S. 1124, 89 S.Ct. 988, 22 L.Ed.2d 132 and Daniels v. O’Conner (Fla.1971), 243 So. 2d 144. Unlike the tenant in an apartment house who, upon eviction, merely has…
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State v. Nell Emerson Mayhew, 288 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1973)…berty of speech in specific situations may be required to yield to valid state or local interests springing from public necessity. Smith v. Ervin, 64 So. 2d 166 (Fla.1953); State ex rel. Nicholas v. Headley, 48 So. 2d 80 (Fla.1950); Adams v. Sutton, 212 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1968); Ex Parte Hawthorne, 116 Fla. 608, 156 So. 619 (1934); Satan Fraternity et al. v. Board of Public Instruction for Dade County et al., 156 Fla. 222, 22 So. 2d 892 (1945); Oshins v. York, 150 Fla. 690, 8 So. 2d 670 (1942); Jones v. Board of…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ex Parte: N. Vernon Hawthorne. Ex Parte: Dan J. Mahoney, 116 Fla. 608 (Fla. 1934)
- State of Fla. ex rel. Alfred Eichenbaum v. Cochran, 114 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1959)
- Smith v. Ervin, 64 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1953)