CHARLES ROGER ELKINS, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant Elkins was convicted in a bench trial of attempting to break and enter a building with intent to commit grand larceny. He challenged the trial court's denial of his motion for a better bill of particulars, arguing the state's specification of the offense date as occurring between April 6-9, 1967, was insufficiently definite. The appellate court affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a better bill of particulars. The specification of the offense as occurring between April 6-9, 1967, between 10:30 p.m. and 2:15 a.m., was sufficiently definite under Florida law.
“The matter was one resting in the sound judicial discretion of the trial court, and upon inspection of the record we conclude no abuse of discretion is shown.”
Establishes the legal standard of review for bills of particulars as discretionary matters subject only to abuse of discretion review.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceElkins was charged with attempting to break and enter a building with intent to commit grand larceny, with the offense alleged to have occurred betwee…
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The appellant was informed against and convicted, in a non-jury trial, of attempting to break and enter a building with intent to commit a felony, to-wit: grand larceny. He was sentenced to confinement in the state penitentiary for years, with credit allowed for 79 days served prior to sentencing. On this appeal therefrom it is contended on behalf of the appellant that the trial court committed reversible error in denying his motion for a better bill of particulars.
In the information the offense charged was alleged to have occurred “between the 6th day of April, 1967, and the 9th day of April 1967.” The defendant moved for a bill of particulars, on April 25, 1967, requesting, among other things, “the exact date, time and place of the alleged crime.” The state attorney filed a bill of particulars on May 15, 1967, which stated, as to the date and time of the alleged offense, “Between April 6, 1967, and April 9, 1967, between 10:30 p. m. and 2:15 a. m.” When the matter came on for trial on May 25, 1967, the case was called, counsel for the parties announced their readiness to proceed, witnesses were sworn and instructed by the court as to their conduct during the trial, and counsel for the defendant then orally moved the court for a better bill of particulars. In presenting that motion counsel for defendant, referring to the bill of particulars which had been filed, stated: “We asked for a statement as to the time of the alleged offense, and we received a reply that it happened between three different days. We don’t think that is definite enough.” In the course of the discussion of the motion the court stated: “The time when we had these motions heard and you get your usual ruling on a bill of particulars, why don’t you, at that time, object, rather than wait until the last minute,” to which counsel for the defendant said: “Well, we will do it from now on.” Thereupon the court overruled the objection to the bill of particulars and denied the motion for a better bill.
We find no error in the ruling, and affirm on the authority of Craig v. State, 95 Fla. 374, 116 So. 272, and Peel v. State, Fla.App.1963, 154 So.2d 910.
The matter was one resting in the sound judicial discretion of the trial court, and upon inspection of the record we conclude no abuse of discretion is shown.
Affirmed.
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Cited By
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Gisi v. State, 848 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…nce this opinion in the notice of appeal. SALCINES and STRINGER, JJ„ Concur. . It is within the trial court’s discretion whether or not to entertain an oral motion for statement of particulars once the trial has [*1283] begun. See Elkins v. State, 212 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968).…
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Miller v. State, 764 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…[*645] ticulars is insufficient as a matter of law. See State v. Covington, 392 So. 2d 1321 (Fla.1981). The denial of a motion for a better bill of particulars is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the trial court. See Elkins v. State, 212 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968). The rule governing charging documents states in pertinent part: (b) Nature of Indictment of Information. The indictment or information on which the defendant is to be tried shall be a plain, concise, and definite written stateme…
Authorities Cited
- Peel v. State, 154 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)
- Craig v. State, 95 Fla. 374 (Fla. 1928)