RALPH TUDELA, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Ralph Tudela was convicted of larceny of an automobile in a bench trial. On appeal, he challenged the admissibility of his oral statement to police, arguing he was not fully advised of his Miranda rights, and also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. The court affirmed, holding that the officer's testimony that he read Miranda warnings from a card was sufficient and that the evidence supported the conviction.
The court held that no reversible error was shown regarding the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to strike the officer's testimony about the oral statement, as the officer's testimony that he read Miranda warnings from a card constituted adequate compliance with Miranda requirements. The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction.
“the requirements of Miranda were not met because the defendant was not advised of his right to have court-appointed counsel present during his interrogation”
Court's prior holding in Woods v. State regarding Miranda compliance deficiencies
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDefendant Ralph Tudela was tried without a jury for larceny of an automobile and pleaded not guilty. A police officer testified that prior to interrog…
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The defendant, Ralph Tudela, was convicted of larceny of an automobile. Trial *388was non-jury and defendant’s plea was not guilty.
One of appellant’s contentions on appeal is that the oral statement made by the defendant to the police officer was inadmissible in evidence because the defendant was not fully advised of his constitutional rights as required under the case of Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.
We have recently had occasion to consider at some length the same contention on another appeal. See Woods v. State, Fla.App.1968, 211 So.2d 248 (opinon of this Court filed June 4, 1968). In that case we held that the requirements of Miranda were not met because the defendant was not advised of his right to have court-appointed counsel present during his interrogation. We further held that the State did not overcome this deficiency by the simple statement of the police officer upon direct examination that he read the advice to the defendant from “a card.”
In the case now before us, the officr testified that prior to the interrogation he advised the defendant of his rights, that he had a right to remain silent, and that he did not have to talk to the officer. In addition, the officer was asked by the court, “Did you read him his rights from the so-called Miranda card?” to which the officer answered “Yes, sir.”
We think that this Court can take judicial notice that a Miranda card, prepared by a police department and used by the officers for the purpose of warning a defendant of his rights, lists the several items required by that decision to be given as warnings. Moreover, when that testimony came in, to the effect that the officer had warned the defendant of his rights by reading from the so-called Miranda card, there was no objection made on behalf of the defendant. No demand was made for production of the card, and the officer was not cross examined with reference to its contents.
We therefore hold that no reversible error has been shown under appellant’s point directed to the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to strike the testimony of the officer relative to the oral statement made to the officer.
Appellant’s other point questions the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the finding of guilt. We hold the evidence was sufficient. See Kearson v. State, 123 Fla. 324, 166 So. 832; Smith v. State, Fla.App.1960, 118 So.2d 257.
Affirmed.
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Citator
Cited By
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R. A. B. v. State, 399 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…se read to R. A. B. from a card. Although this testimony was insufficient to establish that Miranda warnings were given, see Long v. State, 231 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970); Woods v. State, 211 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968); compare Tudela v. State, 212 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968) (testimony that defendant was read his rights in absence of objection), the State offered to refresh Paroti’s recollection by showing him a Miranda card which Reese purportedly read to R. A. B. Again, the court erroneously sustain…
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Tudela v. State, 221 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 1969)…e District Court’s statement regarding judicial notice was obiter which did not control the ultimate judgment. I would simply find it to be obiter and discharge the writ. In the paragraph preceding the one quoted by Justice Drew, the District Court, 212 So. 2d 387, found: "In the case now before us, the officer testified that prior to the interrogation he advised the defendant of his rights, [*144] that he had a right to remain silent, and that he did not have to talk to the officer. In addition, the office…1 / 2
Authorities Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966)
- Kearson v. State, 123 Fla. 324 (Fla. 1936)
- Woods v. State, 211 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- Smith v. State, 118 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960)