STATE, EX REL. KATIE M. LYMAN,
v.
THE CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, ETC., E. H. ARMSTRONG, AS MAYOR-COMMISSIONER, ET AL., AS ZONE COMMISSIONERS, WHO, WITH THE MAYOR-COMMISSIONER, CONSTITUTE THE CITY COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH, ET AL.
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Katie M. Lyman seeks a peremptory writ of mandamus against the City of Daytona Beach to compel the levy of taxes to pay five $1,000 bonds in default with accrued interest since 1933. The Florida Supreme Court granted the writ in part, requiring the city to levy taxes for $3,000 principal plus accrued interest on the 1938 tax roll, while staying execution on the remaining $2,000 principal until 1939 based on equitable considerations.
The relator is entitled to a peremptory writ of mandamus, but the court will apply equitable principles to control its execution. The city must levy taxes on the 1938 roll sufficient to produce $3,000 principal with full accrued interest from July 15, 1933 to January 1, 1938, while staying execution as to the remaining $2,000 principal and interest accruing after January 1, 1938 until the 1939 tax roll.
“Proceedings in mandamus are equitable in nature and, therefore, the writ may be controlled according to equitable principles.”
Establishes the fundamental principle that mandamus writs are subject to equitable control and modification.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFive $1,000 bonds issued by the City of Daytona Beach have been in default since at least July 15, 1933, with 6% per annum interest accruing. The rela…
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This case is before us on motion for peremptory writ of mandamus, the return to the alternative writ notwithstanding.
We have considered the record, the briefs and argument by counsel for the respective parties, and we find that the return alleges no sufficient facts to constitute a defense to the alternative writ.
It appears, however, that it would cause great confusion and inconvenience to the taxpayers, as well as to the defendant municipality for the peremptory writ to require the levy mentioned in the alternative writ to be entered on the tax rolls for 1937. Therefore, the alternative writ will be amended so as to apply to the tax roll of 1938.
The alternative writ seeks' to coerce the levy of a tax sufficient to pay five $1,000.00 bonds which have long been in default, together with interest on such bonds at 6% per annum since the 15th day of July, 1933.
It appears that when the alternative writ shall have been amended as above stated the relator is entitled to have judgment for peremptory writ in accordance therewith.
Proceedings in mandamus are equitable in nature and, therefore, the writ may be controlled according to equitable principles. State, ex rel. Bottome, v. City of St. Petersburg, et al., 126 Fla. 233, 170 Sou. 730.
Having considered the issues and contentions presented in this case in the light of the opinion and judgment' in the case just above cited, it is our judgment that equitable considerations demand a stay in part of the execution of the peremptory writ of mandamus to be issued in this cause. It is, therefore, now adjudged that the execution of the peremptory writ of mandamus as' to $2,000.00 of the principal of the bonds constituting the basis of relator’s claim, together with interest thereon from January 1, 1938, shall be *898stayed until the making up of the tax roll of the respondent corporation for the year 1939, while the writ shall be as promptly as may be executed by entering on the tax rolls of the municipal respondent for the year 1938 a sufficient levy to produce the sum of $3,000.00 principal with interest on the full amount of $5,000.00 from the 15th day of July, 1933, to the 1st day of January, 1938.
It is so ordered.
Ellis, C. J., and Terrell, J., concur.
Whitfield, P. J., and Brown and Chapman, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
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City of Vero Beach v. State, 131 Fla. 195 (Fla. 1938)…y later decisions of this Court. See State v. County of Bay, 112 Fla. 687, 151 So. 10; Baskin v. Klemm, 118 Fla. 657, 160 So. 509; State, [*197] ex rel., v. City of St. Petersburg, 126 Fla. 233, 170 So. 730; State, ex rel., v. City of Daytona Beach, 129 Fla. 896, 176 So. 847. See also Christmas v. City of Asbury Park, 78 Fed. (2nd) 1003; United States, ex rel. Metzger, v. City of Vero Beach, 90 Fed. (2nd) 70. Remanded for appropriate proceedings. Ellis, C. J., and Whitfield, Terrell, Brown, Buford and Cha…
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King v. United States ex rel. Tiedtke, 100 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1939)…of Asbury Park v. Christmas, 3 Cir., 78 F. 2d 1003; United States ex rel. Baer v. Key West, 5 Cir., 78 F. 88; City of East St. Louis v. United States ex rel. Amy, 120 U.S. 600, 7 S.Ct. 739, 30 L.Ed. 798; State ex rel. Lyman v. City of Daytona Beach, 129 Fla. 896, 176 So. 847; City of Cleveland, Tenn. v. United States, 6 Cir., 166 F. 677, 678; Graham v. Quinlan, 6 Cir., 207 F. 268. Appellees, on their part, urge upon us as to the County, the smallness of the judgment against it, and the fact that the levy…
Authorities Cited
- State v. City of St. Petersburg, 126 Fla. 233 (Fla. 1936)