LILLIAN BLOCK, APPELLANT,
v.
SARAH DRUCKER AND M. K. FISHER, APPELLEE
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Lillian Block appeals a jury verdict awarding a real estate commission to brokers Sarah Drucker and M. K. Fisher. The court affirmed, holding that the brokers produced a purchaser on terms acceptable to the seller, satisfying the condition for earning a commission despite the seller's failure to sign the contract.
The brokers earned their commission because they produced a purchaser on terms acceptable to the seller. The jury could reasonably find that Block agreed to all terms and conditions of the contract and merely postponed signing it. The subsequent agreement to reduce the commission was not a valid novation because it lacked consideration, and Block's failure to close the deal further undermined any effect of that reduction.
“the evidence is that the appellant agreed in the presence of the purchaser to all the terms and conditions of the contract and simply postponed signing the contract. Therefore, the jury could find that the appellees produced a purchaser on terms acceptable to the appellant seller.”
The court's reasoning for why the brokers satisfied their obligation to produce a purchaser on acceptable terms despite the seller's failure to sign the contract.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBlock employed brokers Drucker and Fisher to find a purchaser for her property at $79,500 without specifying sale terms. The brokers produced a purcha…
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The appellant, Lillian Block, was the defendant in the trial court. She appeals a final judgment entered upon a jury verdict in a cause of action brought by the appellees, Sarah Drucker and M. K. Fisher, claiming a real estate commission.
The evidence is conflicting upon the issue of whether the appellee brokers produced a purchaser who agreed to purchase upon terms and conditions satisfactory to the appellant seller. This was the central issue of the trial, and it was resolved by the jury.
There is evidence in the record upon which the jury could have found that the appellant employed the brokers simply to find a purchaser for her property at a purchase price of $79,500 without specifying the terms of the sale; that the appellees produced a purchaser who signed a contract for the purchase of the property for $74,000; and that the appellant then agreed to sell her property at that price and upon the terms set out in the contract.
*891Appellant urges that under these circumstances her oral agreement to sell was not sufficient to entitle the appellees to a commission, because verbal accord was reached as to price only. This issue was squarely presented to the jury, and by their verdict they found that the appellant agreed to sell upon the terms and conditions of the contract that was presented to her, although she did not sign the contract. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the parties proceeded in their actions as though they had reached agreement as to the terms of the contract.
The appellant relies for reversal upon the holding in McAllister Hotel v. Porte, Fla. 1957, 98 So.2d 781. We think that the holding in that case is not controlling because there the claim to a commission was based entirely upon a mere verbal accord between the parties as to the price. In the present instance the evidence is that the appellant agreed in the presence of the purchaser to all the terms and conditions of the contract and simply postponed signing the contract. Therefore, the jury could find that the appellees produced a purchaser on terms acceptable to the appellant seller. There was evidence that the appellant postponed signing the contract because she was not fully convinced that she ought to accept the terms, but the jury found to the contrary, and there is evidence to support the jury finding. Cf. Mellet v. Henry, Fla.App.1959, 108 So.2d 69.
Appellant also argues that the verdict cannot stand because the appellees admitted that after the parties had agreed on terms and conditions, the appellees agreed to accept a lesser commission than the one they had originally asked, because the appellant would not close the deal if the ap-pellees would not accept the lesser commission. This agreement was not an effective novation of the original agreement since it was not supported by consideration. See Spann v. Baltzell, 1 Fla. 301, 314, 46 Am. Dec. 346 (1847). In addition it may be noted that appellant did not close the deal but accepted a subsequent offer for a higher price from another purchaser.
Appellant’s third point charges that the admission of certain evidence was error. No error is shown by the record because the appellant herself volunteered the statement on a collateral issue which the court then allowed the appellees to impeach. But see Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Holliday, 73 Fla. 269, 74 So. 479, 484 (1917).
Affirmed.
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Mid-Florida Realty Assocs., Inc. v. R.F. Truesdell and the Estate of Joseph O. Young, 454 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)…(Fla. 2d DCA 1961). Further, such waiver or acceptance may be proved by showing actions or words of the seller inconsistent with a posture of rejecting the contract, Taylor, or by express assent to the contract—written or verbal. Block v. Drucker, 212 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968). Such communications between buyer and seller may be transmitted through the parties’ attorneys. See Schuele v. Sposato, 177 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965). In this case we think Mid-Florida pleaded a cause of action against appel…
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Wilder v. Thomas J. Zaydon et ux., 330 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1976)…s cause because of apparent conflict between the instant decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, reported at 305 So. 2d [*134] 81 (Fla.App.1974) and the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, in Block v. Drucker, 212 So. 2d 890 (Fla.App. 1968). After hearing argument and upon further consideration of the matter, we have determined that the Court is without jurisdiction. Therefore, the Writ heretofore issued is discharged. It is so ordered. OVERTON, C. J., and ROBERTS, A…
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Roberts & Schaefer Co. v. Hardaway Co., 152 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 1998)…997). Consequently, when R & S accepted Harda-way’s bid, a contract was formed under Florida law. Moreover, we note that wheré parties act as though a contract exists, there is a contract, even though no formal writing exists. See Block v. Drucker, 212 So. 2d 890, 891 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1968). In this case, following R & S’s acceptance of Hardaway’s bid and several negotiation meetings and discussions, Hardaway submitted pay applications and received.payment for several months of above-ground pipe work on the…
Authorities Cited
- McALLISTER Hotel, Inc. v. Porte, 98 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 1957)
- Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Holliday, 73 Fla. 269 (Fla. 1917)
- Spann v. Baltzell, 1 Fla. 301 (Fla. 1847)
- Mellet v. Henry, 108 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)