DIANE HOFFMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
LEO ROBINSON, INDIVIDUALLY, TED BODIN, INDIVIDUALLY, UNIVERSAL KNITTING MILLS, INC., UNIVERSAL FABRICS, INC., AND B. B. B. KNITTING MILLS, INC., APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1968-08-13
No. 68-70
Before PEARSON and HENDRY, JJ., and PIERCE, WILLIAM C., Associate Judge.
213 So. 2d 267 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1968) Positive Treatment
Cited by 30 cases

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Holding

The court held that a provision in paragraph four of the employment contract did not refer to the length of employment, despite mentioning a 25-year period.


Facts & Procedural History

Plaintiff appealed a summary judgment in an action for breach of an employment contract. The plaintiff argued that a clause in the contract provided f…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a summary final judgment for the defendants in an action seeking damages for *268the breach of an employment contract. It is clear under the theory sued upon that the plaintiff could recover only if the written contract provided a definite period of employment. See Sher v. Shower Door Company of America, Ltd., Fla.App.1967, 197 So.2d 333, and cases cited therein.

The appellant contends that since paragraph four, subsection (c), of the contract provides that “this agreement shall remain in force for a period of twenty-five (25) years from the date hereof,” the contract either provides that she be employed for twenty-five years, or it is ambiguous as to the duration of her employment; if the contract is ambiguous then it must be construed in favor of the appellant, the non-drafter of the contract.

The trial court found this contention untenable because only paragraph one of the contract deals with employment.

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“1. HOFFMAN agrees to immediately accept employment with KNITTING at a salary of $25,000.00 per annum, payable weekly.”

Paragraph four deals with the exercising of a stock option and the rights of the parties if the option is exercised.

The legal effect of a contract must be determined from the words of the entire contract. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Neuhoff, 157 Fla. 98, 24 So.2d 906 (1946). A court may not violate the clear meaning of a contract in order to create an ambiguity. Voelker v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, Fla.1954, 73 So.2d 403, 408.

We hold that from a reading of the contract as a whole, it is clear that the quoted portion of paragraph four, subsection (c), of the contract does not refer to the length of employment. Therefore, the trial court was correct in granting summary final judgment for the appellees.

Affirmed.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (17 total)

  • …otice. This language is very similar to language abating the employment guarantee in sections 3 and 4. In construing a contract, the legal effect of its provisions should be determined from the words of the entire contract. See Hoffman v. Robinson, 213 So. 2d 267, 268 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968). Reviewing all of the provisions of the contract, we find that the trial court’s construction does not comport with this principle, as it leaves out several words and phrases, particularly by ignoring the parenthetical after…
  • Inter-Active Servs., Inc. v. Heathrow Master Ass'n, Inc., 721 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
    …in the project has its components installed and monitoring services are commenced. When a contract’s provisions are clear and unambiguous on their face, a court may not violate the clear meaning in order to create an ambiguity. Hoffman v. Robinson, 213 So. 2d 267, 268 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968). When possible, courts should give effect to each provision of a written instrument in order to ascertain the true meaning of the instrument. Excelsior Ins. Co. v. Pomona Park Bar & Package Store, 369 So. 2d 938, 941 (Fla.197…
  • Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Editorial Am., S.A., 374 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
    …ck, 172 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965); Bituminous Casualty Corporation v. Lewis Crane Service, Inc., 173 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965), and the legal effect of a contract must be determined from the words of the entire contract. Hoffman v. Robinson, 213 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968). Looking to the language of Section 14 of the endorsement, “14. The terms and conditions of this form are to be regarded as substituted for those of the policy to which it is attached, the latter being hereby waived.” [*1074] it…

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