LLOYD V. MURPHY, APPELLANT,
v.
JOHN HANCOCK MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE
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An insurance applicant sought to enforce an alleged oral contract with an insurance agent, claiming the agent's promise to insure him and acceptance of his premium payment created a binding policy. The court affirmed summary judgment for the insurer, holding that the parol evidence rule barred consideration of the alleged oral agreement, and the written application's express prohibition on agent waivers prevented the agent from binding the company.
The court held that the appellant's testimony regarding the alleged oral contract was inadmissible under the parol evidence rule, and the agent could not bind the company to issue a policy when the written application expressly prohibited the agent from waiving any condition or contracting to issue a policy.
“the trial judge correctly found that appellant's testimony as to the alleged oral contract would not be admissible at trial because of the parol evidence rule”
Establishes that the written application governed and oral testimony about an alleged oral contract was inadmissible.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe appellant applied for health and accident insurance and claimed the soliciting agent orally assured him he was insured and accepted his check paym…
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The appellant, plaintiff below, seeks reversal of a summary final judgment for the defendant insurance company. The appellant had prayed the court to order the appellee to issue a health and accident insurance policy and to determine the benefits he was entitled to under the policy. He claimed that an oral assurance by the soliciting agent for the appellee that he was insured and the acceptance by the agent of his check in payment of the premium on the policy bound the appellee company.
The application which appellant signed at the culmination of the alleged conversation expressly provided that the application would be deemed to have been declined unless it was approved within sixty days and expressly forbade an agent to waive any condition of the application.
The trial judge correctly found that appellant’s testimony as to the alleged oral contract would not be admissible at trial because of the parol evidence rule. See Sears v. James Talcott, Inc., Fla.App.1965, 174 So.2d 776, 778. Cf. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Tedder, 113 Fla. 649, 153 So. 145, 148 (1934).
The authority cited by appellant for his position that an enforceable contract came into being upon the agent’s alleged oral promise to insure is Eagle Fire Co. v. Lewallen, 56 Fla. 246, 47 So. 947 (1909). In that case the Supreme Court affirmed a judgment of the trial court in which the policyholder recovered upon a fire insurance policy. The company had defended upon a provision of the policy which required that other insurance upon the same property should be endorsed upon or added to the policy. The court held that under the circumstances of that case the agent was the alter ego of the company and that *276the company had by its actions allowed the insured to rely upon the policy so that it would amount to fraud for the company to later assert a provision of the policy which the agent represented would be waived. We do not think the holding in that case amounts to a statement that an agent can bind a company by contracting to issue a policy when the written application expressly states that the agent cannot so contract.
Affirmed.
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Almerico v. RLI Ins. Co., 716 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1998)…to the alleged agent. Id. at 690. We considered the fact that the applicants never signed the application form and that the “agent” never held himself out as an agent of the insurance company. Id. See also Murphy v. John Hancock Mut. Life. Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 275, 275 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968) (affirming summary judgment in favor of insurer where application had explicit provisions which, among other things, “expressly forbade an agent to waive any condition” thereof). STATUTORY INTERPRETATION Florida has an exte…1 / 2
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Rowland v. Nat'l States Ins. Co., 295 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)…BOYER, Judge. The trial judge entered a summary final judgment in favor of the defendant below, National States Insurance Company, citing Murphy v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., Fla.App. (3rd) 1968, 213 So. 2d 275. Plaintiff appealed and we reverse. Plaintiff Rosa Lea Rowland is the mother of plaintiff Gregory B. Rowland who was, at all times material hereto, 19 years of age. On August 28, 1972 defendant’s agent D. M. Doyle went to the home of the plaintiff…
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Steele v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 691 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)…urer, where she had been diagnosed a paranoid schizophrenic and had been hospitalized for psychiatric treatment five times, the most recent being involuntary and within months of making the application. See Murphy v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968); cf. Gaskins; Russell. Thus, even if Middleton was JNL’s agent for some purposes, and even if he had apparent authority for some purposes, the Steeles were on notice to inquire as to the scope of Middleton’s authority and could no…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- The Eagle Fire Co. v. Lewallen, 56 Fla. 246 (Fla. 1908)
- Sears v. James Talcott, Inc., 174 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965)
- N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Tedder, 113 Fla. 649 (Fla. 1933)