LYONS

v.

CALIFORNIA

Citator

Cited By (38 total)

• Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (U.S. 1986)
  …s conclusively establish intent, so that no rational jury could find that the defendant committed [*581] the relevant criminal act but did not intend to cause injury. See, e. g., Lamb v. Jernigan, 683 F. 2d 1332, 1342-1343 (CA11 1982), cert. denied, 460 U. S. 1024 (1983). In that event the erroneous instruction is simply superfluous: the jury has found, in Winship’s words, “every fact necessary” to establish every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Connecticut v. Johnson, supra, at 97 (Po…
• Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1985)
  …elements: intent to kill and the absence of provocation or justification. See Patterson v. State, 239 Ga. 409, 416-417, 238 S. E. 2d 2, 8 (1977); Lamb v. Jernigan, 683 F. 2d 1332, 1337 (CA11 1982) (interpreting Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-1), cert. denied, 460 U. S. 1024 (1983). At another point in the charge in this case, the trial court, consistently with this understanding of Georgia law, instructed the jury that malice is “the unlawful, deliberate intention to kill a human being without justification or mitiga…
• Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383 (11th Cir. 1985)
  …on several building blocks. First, the state correctly notes that malice murder in Georgia is defined as an intentional killing done without [*1389] provocation or justification. Lamb v. Jernigan, 683 F. 2d 1332, 1336 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1024, 103 S.Ct. 1276, 75 L.Ed.2d 496 (1983). Second, the state argues that there was in this case no hint of provocation or justification,4 so that the only sub-element of malice which might possibly have been in dispute was intent. Third, the state ar…

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