METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
C. E. GREENLEE, APPELLEE
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This case involves a dispute over the proper method of challenging a county's zoning decision. The court held that while a resolution denying a zoning change request is typically reviewed by certiorari, a separate lawsuit is permissible if the complaint broadly challenges the validity or constitutionality of the underlying zoning ordinance.
Yes, a separate lawsuit is permissible to challenge a county commission's denial of a zoning change request if the complaint includes a general challenge to the validity or constitutionality of the controlling zoning ordinance.
“To the extent the complaint challenges the constitutionality or validity of the controlling zoning ordinance, a separate suit was authorized and the motion to dismiss was properly denied.”
This quote establishes the court's reasoning for allowing a separate lawsuit.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellee Greenlee sought a mandatory injunction to compel Metropolitan Dade County to liberalize zoning on his property after the county commission de…
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By this interlocutory appeal, Metropolitan Dade County seeks reversal of an order of the circuit court denying its motion to dismiss a complaint filed by the appellee seeking to mandatorily enjoin the county to liberalize the zoning on his parcel of property, following refusal of his request before the county commission.
The thrust of appellant’s argument is that since the action of the county commission was by resolution rather than by an ordinance the prescribed method of review was by certiorari, citing and relying on Land Corporation of Florida v. Metropolitan Dade County, Fla.App.1967, 204 So.2d 222, decided by this court following Dade County v. Metro Improvement Corp., Fla.App.1966, 190 So.2d 202.
The appellee contends that proceeding by separate suit was proper because his complaint presents a general challenge to the validity of the zoning ordinance. To the extent the complaint challenges the constitutionality or validity of the controlling zoning ordinance, a separate suit was authorized and the motion to dismiss was properly denied. See City of Miami Beach v. Perell, Fla.1951, 52 So.2d 906; Harris v. Goff, Fla.App.1963, 151 So.2d 642. Such a separate suit would not be appropriate to review the resolution of the county commission sought there on grounds other than a general challenge of invalidity of the zoning ordinance, and in fact in appellee’s brief it is stated that by the present suit the appellee does not seek to have the circuit court review the county commission’s resolution with reference to the bases or grounds on which the appellee there sought a change of zoning.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Otto S. Baker and Bertha H. Baker v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 237 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)…han presenting a general challenge to the validity of the zoning ordinance. Under such circumstances, the rule is that certiorari is the proper method of challenging the county commission’s ruling. Metropolitan Dade County v. Greenlee, Fla.App.1968, 213 So. 2d 485; Land Corporation of Florida v. Metropolitan Dade County, Fla.App.1967, 204 So. 2d 222, cert. denied, 210 So. 2d 224; Dade County v. Metro Improvement Corporation, Fla.App.1966, 190 So. 2d 202. The commission’s procedure, i.e., utilizing the resolut…
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Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Greenlee, 224 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)…propriety of the method used to review this final [*782] judgment for reasons set forth hereafter. We note, however, that plaintiff’s complaint was before us previously on an interlocutory appeal. Metropolitan Dade County v. Greenlee, Fla.App.1968, 213 So. 2d 485. The plaintiff owns approximately ten acres of land which is bordered on the north by S. W. 272nd Street, hereinafter called Epmore Drive and on the east by Krome Avenue (State Road 27) both of which are two lane roads. The property is located nort…
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Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. OF Ga. v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 346 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)…elling units . . . .” § 380.04(2)(b), Fla.Stat. (1975). . Centex Homes Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 318 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Baker v. Metropolitan Dade County, 237 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970); Metropolitan Dade County v. Greenlee, 213 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968); Land Corporation of Florida v. Metropolitan Dade County, 204 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967), cert. denied, 210 So. 2d 224 (Fla.1968); Dade County v. Carmichael, 165 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964). . Odham v. Foremost Dairies, Inc.…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Harris v. H.A. Goff, 151 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963)
- City of Miami Beach v. Perell, 52 So.2d 906 (Fla. 1951)
- Dade Cnty. v. Metro Improvement Corp., 190 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)
- Land Corp. OF Fla. v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 204 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)
- Thomas v. Gen. Fin. Corp. OF Fla., 204 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)