THERESE SHAW, APPELLANT,
v.
BANKERS LIFE COMPANY, AN IOWA CORPORATION, AND NATIONAL DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, INC., A GEORGIA CORPORATION, APPELLEES
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The surviving spouse of an insured appeals summary judgment for the insurance company in a dispute over the effective date of an insurance policy. The court upholds the trial judge's interpretation of an ambiguous policy clause, holding that the clause's grammar clearly establishes when coverage becomes effective.
The court held that the policy language is not ambiguous; the words 'coinciding with or next following' clearly modify 'first day of the insurance month,' not 'insurance month,' and thus the trial judge's interpretation was correct. Under ordinary rules of English grammar, this clear meaning may not be changed by the court.
“terms in an insurance policy which are ambiguous, equivocal, or uncertain must be construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured so as to effect the primary purpose of payment to the insured”
Establishes the governing rule for interpreting insurance policies when ambiguity exists.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHerman Shaw obtained an insurance policy from Bankers Life Company through National Distributing Company. After Shaw's death, his surviving spouse and…
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The plaintiff, surviving spouse of Herman Shaw and executrix of his estate, appeals a summary final judgment for the defendants, Bankers Life Company and National Distributing Company, Inc., in an action on an insurance policy. The factual basis for the summary judgment is not disputed. The determinative question is whether the trial judge’s ruling as to the meaning of a clause of the insurance policy was correct.
The appellant relies upon the principle that terms in an insurance policy which are ambiguous, equivocal, or uncertain must be construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured so as to effect the primary purpose of payment to the insured. Firemans Fund Ins. Co. of San Francisco v. Boyd, Fla.1950, 45 So.2d 499; National Casualty Co. v. General Motors Accept. Corp., Fla.App.1964, 161 So.2d 848; Miller Elec. Co. of Fla. v. Employers’ Liability Assur. Corp., Fla.App. 1965, 171 So.2d 40.
Appellee does not controvert this principle but maintains that as a matter of law the meaning of the clause in question is clear and unambiguous.
The pivotal clause concerns the effective date of the insurance policy.
«* * * * * *
“ * * * Such insurance, when so requested, shall become effective on the first day of the insurance month coinciding with or next following
(a) the date the person is eligible, if the request is made on or before that date; or
(b) the date of the request, if it is made after but within thirty-one days following the date the person is eligible; * * * ”
The appellant contends that the words “on the first day of the insurance month coinciding with or next following * * * the date of the request” may be construed so that the words “coinciding with or next following” refer to and modify the words “insurance month.” We agree with the trial judge that such an interpretation is not reasonable and that clearly the words “coinciding with or next following” modify the phrase “first day of the insurance month.”
Where the meaning of a contract is clear under the ordinary rules of English, this clear meaning may not be changed by the court. See Prescott v. Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass’n, 133 Fla. 510, 183 So. 311, 119 A.L.R. 525 (1938).
Affirmed.
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MacINTYRE v. Green's Pool Serv., Inc., 347 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)…ontract will be construed according to its own clear and unambiguous terms. Arnold v. First Savings and Trust Co., 104 Fla. 545, 141 So. 608 (1932); Voelker v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 73 So. 2d 403 (Fla.1954); and Shaw v. Bankers Life Company, 213 So. 2d 514 (Fla.3d DCA 1968). It should be noted that the terms of the contract were followed by the parties in their dealing and that no claim or bill for 16% of additional construction cost was made until the filing of the counterclaim by the architect. The…
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Institutional & Supermarket Equip., Inc. v. C & S Refrigeration, Inc., 609 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)…t no other meaning. Hamilton Const. Co. v. Board of Public Instruction of Dade County, 65 So. 2d 729 (Fla.1953). Where words of a contract are clear and definite, they must be understood according to their ordinary meaning. Shaw v. Bankers Life Co., 213 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968). Here the words are definite and must be construed according to their ordinary meaning. Moreover, the reason why ISE may have desired to insert this very language into the guaranty is illustrated by this very case, namely so that…
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Davis v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 450 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)…and effect to the terms of an insurance contract where the meaning is clear and it is susceptible of only one interpretation. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company v. DeSalvo, 174 Colo. 115, 482 P. 2d 380 (1971); Shaw v. Bankers Life Company, 213 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968); see 44 Am.Jur.2d Insurance § 1845 (1982). Because I think there is no ambiguity as to the language of this policy and no dispute as to the facts which determine coverage, I would affirm the summary judgment. . 30 C.J.S. Employ (…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Firemans Fund Ins. Co. of San Francisco v. Boyd, 45 So.2d 499 (Fla. 1950)
- Prescott v. Mut. Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 133 Fla. 510 (Fla. 1938)
- Miller Elec. Co. OF Fla. v. The Emp'rs' Liab. Assurance Corp., 171 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965)
- Nat'l Cas. Co. v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 161 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964)