JOHN C. SPROAT, APPELLANT,
v.
ELIZABETH ARNAU, CITY CLERK OF THE CITY OF DEERFIELD BEACH, AN INCORPORATED MUNICIPALITY IN AND OF BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA AND THE CITY OF DEERFIELD BEACH, AN INCORPORATED MUNICIPALITY OF AND IN BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
John Sproat, a Deerfield Beach city commissioner, appealed a circuit court judgment denying injunctive relief to stop recall proceedings against him. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a city charter provision allowing recall based solely on loss of public confidence, rejecting Sproat's due process challenge.
The court held that the legislature has the prerogative to define grounds for recall, and a charter provision allowing recall based on loss of confidence is constitutionally valid and does not deprive an official of property rights in his office without due process.
“In the face of unambiguous legislative definition of grounds for recall, the act presents, of course, no question of construction. We find that the applicable principles of law and precedent clearly sustain the legislative prerogative in this regard.”
Establishes the court's holding that the legislature has broad authority to define recall grounds without constitutional constraint
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSproat was a city commissioner of Deerfield Beach. A recall petition was filed against him citing grounds that "a majority of the electors of the City…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Affidavit Requirements cases and more on FLexlaw
This appeal is from a final judgment of the circuit court denying injunctive relief against a proceeding for recall of the appellant Sproat, a city commissioner of the City of Deerfield Beach. The appeal has been transferred from the district court because the judgment sustained the validity of a statute, Sec. 42 of Chapter 67-2317, Laws of Florida, Special Acts of 1967, against assault on constitutional grounds.1
The statute in question, the Charter of the City of Deerfield Beach, provides in part:
“ * * * The statement of grounds for recall shall be sufficient in law if the grounds are merely that ‘A majority of the electors of the City of Deer-field Beach have lost confidence in the Commissioner or Commissioners’ sought to be recalled. * * * ”
Appellant contends that recall on this ground, stated in the petitions, would deprive him of his property right to his office without due process of law.2 The question presented is one of first impression.
*693Earlier cases on which appellant relies involve the sufficiency of recall petitions under acts providing only that petitions shall contain a sworn “statement of the grounds for removal.”3 This Court held simply that the legislative intent was to require a statement of facts, and that a charge of activities that are inimical to the best interests of the citizens was not sufficiently specific to constitute substantial compliance with the quoted provision, construed to require that the misdeed charged should be a real foundation for such action having some relationship to performance of the duties of office.
In the present case, however, the petition states precisely the charge upon which initiation of recall proceedings is authorized by the charter. In the face of unambiguous legislative definition of grounds for recall, the act presents, of course, no question of construction. We find that the applicable principles of law and precedent clearly sustain the legislative prerogative in this regard.4 Our conclusion on this point makes unnecessary any conideration or disposition of the issue of estoppel based on appellant’s participation in the enactment of the law, urged by appellees in support of the judgment here and applied in some analogous situations.5
Other objections by appellant relate to alleged discrepancy between the literal language of the act6 and the affidavit in this case by the circulator of the petitions that he “saw all the signatures appended thereto, and knows that they are the signatures of the persons whose names they purport to be.” The statement on its face reflects full compliance with the charter requirements.
The judgment is affirmed.
CALDWELL, C. J., and THORNAL, ERVIN and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Taines v. Galvin, 279 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1973)…ay illegal. Clearly, these charges were insufficient under the rules above-cited. City charters may, of course, contain less onerous requirements for recall affidavits, including no requirement at all for a statement of grounds. In Sproat v. Arnau, 213 So. 2d 692 (Fla.1968), we considered a charter which provided that grounds would be sufficient if they were only that a majority of the electors had lost confidence in the commissioners sought to be recalled. We upheld an affidavit which alleged only such a lo…
-
Garvin v. Jerome, 767 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 2000)…985), in which the majority distinguished between recall for cause and recall at will), "[a]ny time a recall petition is filed, one may assume that members of the electorate are dissatisfied with the elected.” 707 P. 2d at 1345. Cf. Sproat v. Arnau, 213 So. 2d 692 (Fla.1968)(upholding as constitutionally sufficient — in a case predating the uniform recall statute currently embodied in section 100.361 — an affidavit in support of a recall petition alleging loss of confidence in elected officials, where the cit…
-
Freemon Collins v. City OF Opa-Locka, 251 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)…, the grounds for recall must have some real foundation or relation to the performance of the duties of a commissioner. Joyner v. Shuman, Fla.App.1959, 116 So. 2d 472; Richard v. Tomlinson, Fla.1951, 49 So. 2d 798; and see Sproat v. Arnau, Fla.1968, 213 So. 2d 692. The allegations herein do not meet that standard. Furthermore, we note that certain of the allegations' of misconduct are ambiguous. Therefore, the judgment appealed is affirmed. Affirmed.…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Honorable George W. Tedder, 106 Fla. 140 (Fla. 1932)
- State ex rel. George Couper Gibbs v. Couch, 139 Fla. 353 (Fla. 1939)
- Richard v. Tomlinson, 49 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1951)
- State v. Crooks, 153 Fla. 694 (Fla. 1943)
- Joyner v. Shuman, 116 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959)
- DuBose v. Kelly, 132 Fla. 548 (Fla. 1938)
- State of Fla. ex rel. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Vill. OF N. Palm Beach, 138 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)