PETER KARTIKES, JAMES ZABETIAS, MICHAEL MACKARONIS AND GEORGE KARTIKES, JR., APPELLANTS,
v.
ANGELO DEMOS, APPELLEE
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Appellants sought damages for attorney malpractice against defendant Demos. The trial court dismissed their second amended complaint without leave to amend. The appellate court reversed, holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for breach of an attorney's duty to perform agreed-upon services.
The court held that the complaint states a sufficient cause of action for breach of an attorney's duty to perform services explicitly or implicitly agreed upon. The court reversed the dismissal and directed the trial court to grant appellants an opportunity to file a third amended complaint.
“A client has a cause of action in contract against an attorney who neglects to perform services he explicitly or implicitly agreed to perform when he agreed to be employed by the client.”
Establishes the controlling legal standard for attorney malpractice claims based on breach of contract
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellants retained attorney Demos to perform legal services. Demos allegedly neglected to perform services he had explicitly or implicitly agreed to …
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The appellants suffered a dismissal of their second amended complaint without leave to further amend. They had sought compensatory and punitive damages for the alleged malpractice of defendant-appellee, Demos, an attorney. The record brought to this court consists of the second amended complaint, the motion to dismiss that complaint, and the final judgment of dismissal. We reverse.
We hold that the complaint states a cause of action under the principle set out in Messana v. Maule Industries, Fla.1951, 50 So.2d 874, 876. We also continue to follow the rule in Weekley v. Knight, 116 Fla. 721, 156 So. 625 (1934), and Solomon v. Meyer, Fla.App. 1959, 116 So.2d 37: A client has a cause of action in contract against an attorney who neglects to perform services he explicitly or implicitly *87agreed to perform when he agreed to be employed by the client.
We expressly reject appellants’ proposition that the allegations of a complaint against an attorney for malpractice need contain only legal conclusions rather than ultimate facts, as in certain types of automobile negligence actions. See Form 1.945, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure (1967), 31 F.S.A. We simply hold that the allegations of appellants’ second amended complaint, if proved, are sufficient to show a breach of the duty owed by the attorney to his client under the circumstances set forth in the complaint.
The complaint does contain legal conclusions and surplusage. We therefore reverse with directions to enter an order granting the appellant an opportunity to file a third amended complaint. Appellee suggests that this procedure is incorrect because, since there was no substantial difference between the allegations of the first amended complaint and the allegations of the second amended complaint, it was proper for the circuit court to dismiss the second amended complaint without leave to amend for failure to obey an order of the court. See Warriner v. Ferraro, Fla.App. 1965, 177 So.2d 723, cert. denied, Fla., 188 So.2d 319, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 995, 85 S. Ct. 610, 17 L.Ed.2d 454. We must reject this argument because the appellee did not see fit to supplement the record by cross-directing the clerk of the circuit court to include a copy of the first amended complaint in the record so that this court might take the allegations of that complaint into consideration.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Arky v. Bowmar Instrument Corp., 527 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…ng have been replaced by the more liberal “notice pleading,” it remains necessary in the setting of a legal malpractice case to plead more than the naked legal conclusion that the defendant was negligent. As this court declared in Kartikes v. Demos, 214 So. 2d 86, 87 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968), “[w]e expressly reject [the plaintiff’s] proposition that the allegations of a complaint against an attorney for malpractice need contain only legal conclusions rather than ultimate facts, as in certain types of automobile ne…
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Dillard Smith Constr. Co. v. Greene, 337 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)…within the meaning of the contract requirement. In these circumstances, it is not sufficient that appellant alleges by way of conclusion that his lawyer negligently misconstrued the contract’s “simple” meaning and “plain wording.” Kartikes v. Demos, 214 So. 2d 86 (Fla.App.3d, 1968). See Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E. 2d 144, 45 A.L.R.2d 1 (1954). The trial court was correct also in holding insufficient the complaint’s general allegations, in specification (c) above, concerning the lawyer’s neglect…
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Bates v. The Keyes Co., 261 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)…aside default show excusable neglect. Appellee, of course, urges that excusable neglect was not shown and urges affirmance of the order denying the motion to set aside the default judgment pursuant to the holding in Kartikes v. Demos, Fla.App.1968, 214 So. 2d 86, and Solomon v. Meyer, Fla.App.1959, 116 So. 2d 37. We think that the facts of this case are more properly governed by the principles set forth in North Shore Hospital, Inc. v. Barber, Fla.1962, 143 So. 2d 849, and Imperial Industries, Inc. v. Moore…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Mrs. Ruby Knight Weekley v. Knight, 116 Fla. 721 (Fla. 1934)
- Warriner v. Ferraro, 177 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)
- Messana v. Maule Indus., 50 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1951)
- Childs v. Nehi Bottling Co., 188 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 1966)
- Lee v. Wilson, 385 U.S. 995 (U.S. 1966)
- Mathis v. Wainwright, 385 U.S. 995 (U.S. 1966)
- Solomon v. Baron de Hirsch Meyer and Milton Weiss, 116 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)