JONES
v.
ILLINOIS

U.S. | 1983-10-17
No. 82-6913
464 U.S. 920 Supreme Court of the United States (1983) Caution
Cited by 11 cases
Dissent
Justice Brennan,

Justice Brennan,

dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227 (1976), I would vacate the death sentence in this case.

Dissent
Justice Marshall,

Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is under all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, I would vacate the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois insofar as it left undisturbed the death sentence imposed in this case. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). However, even if I believed that the death penalty could be imposed constitutionally under certain circumstances, I would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence imposed here.

Given the wording of the Illinois death penalty statute and the trial court’s instructions in this case, I am not convinced that petitioner’s sentencing jury balanced mitigating factors and aggravating circumstances in the manner required by this Court in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978), and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104 (1982).

Under the Illinois statute, once a sentencing jury finds a statutorily defined aggravating factor to exist, the jury proceeds to consider aggravating and mitigating factors. “If the jury determines unanimously that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence, the court shall sentence the defendant to death.” Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 88, ¶ 9 — 1(g) (Supp. 1982).

At the sentencing trial in this case, the trial judge instructed the jury on how to evaluate mitigating evidence: “ ‘[Y]ou go out and determine whether or not this evidence has taken away the [aggravating] factors, mitigated the factors so that you might say no, we don’t want to vote for the death penalty.’” See People v. Jones, 94 Ill. 2d 275, 302, 447 N. E. 2d 161, 174 (1982) (Simon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Notwithstanding other portions of the trial court’s instructions, this instruction coupled with the Illinois statute’s ambiguous reference to “preclud[ing] the imposition of the death sentence” may well have led the sentencing jury to conduct its deliberation under the assumption that petitioner had the burden of proving that the death penalty was inappropriate in his particular case. Since I do not understand this Court’s precedents to permit the placing of such a burden on a defendant, I would grant the petition.

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Citator

Cited By (11 total)

  • Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. O'Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1992)
    …itself. See, e.g., Meyers v. Moody, 693 F. 2d 1196, 1208 (5th Cir.1982) (“A party may not invoke an estoppel for the purpose of shielding himself from the results of his own fraud, dereliction of duty, or other inequitable conduct.”), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 920, 104 S.Ct. 287, 78 L.Ed.2d 264 (1983).8 We conclude that ADSB has a corporate identity distinct from that of its wrongdoing officers. B Role and Rights of FDIC Even assuming Sahni and Day’s knowledge would be imputed to ADSB so that ADSB would be…
  • Coleman v. Risley, 839 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1988)
    …ng that the language of the Illinois statute in Gacy is similar to that of the statute challenged here, but in that case the Illinois courts, unlike Montana’s, had not made it clear that the burden falls on the defendant. See also Jones v. Illinois, 464 U.S. 920, 104 S.Ct. 287, 78 L.Ed.2d 264 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of cert.). . The Fifth and the Eleventh Circuits have decided cases involving claims by defendants that a death penalty statute unconstitutionally placed on them the burden…
  • United States v. Shearn Moody, Jr., 923 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1991)
    …in 1972. One result of the company’s demise was a civil fraud action against Moody personally, resulting in a $6 million judgment, entered January 1980, which was affirmed by this court. Meyers v. Moody, 693 F. 2d 1196 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 920, 104 S.Ct. 287, 78 L.Ed.2d 264 (1983). At that time, the judgment, including interest, totalled approximately $12 million. In 1980, approximately three months after entry of the district court judgment, Moody created the 1980 Trust to provide a lif…

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