GEORGE M. COGGAN, APPELLANT,
v.
SARAH M. COGGAN, APPELLEE
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This case concerns a divorced wife's request for an increase in alimony after her teenage son, who previously lived with her, moved to live with his father. The court affirmed the increase in alimony, finding the chancellor did not abuse his discretion, but reversed the award of attorney's fees due to a lack of supporting evidence.
1. Yes, the change in circumstances, including the husband's increased earnings and the wife's disputed ability to work, supported an increase in alimony. 2. No, the award of attorney's fees was improper due to a lack of evidence.
“The chancellor, who heard the parties and is in a better position to determine this question than we are, allowed an increase in alimony, taking into account increased earnings of the husband and controverted evidence about the wife's physical condition and ability to seek gainful employment.”
This quote establishes the basis for the court's affirmation of the alimony increase, highlighting the chancellor's discretion and the factors considered.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA divorced wife sought an increase in alimony after her teen-age son, who had been living with her, moved to live with his father. The wife argued tha…
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This interlocutory appeal presents the question whether, on transfer of custody of a teen-age son who now prefers to live with his father, the diminution of the wife’s revenues by the amount of the support money is such a change in circumstances as will support an increase in alimony to an amount less than the former combined total of alimony and support. The chancellor, who heard the parties and is in a better position to determine this question than we are, allowed an increase in alimony, taking into account increased earnings of the husband and controverted evidence about the wife’s physical condition and ability to seek gainful employment. He has a broad discretion under Florida Statutes § 61.14 (1967), F.S.A. and has not been shown to have abused it. Plainly the expenses of the wife are not diminished pro rata. See the annotation at 18 A.L.R.2d 10 at 90; Zalka v. Zalka, 100 So.2d 157 (Fla.1958); Katiba v. Katiba, 110 So.2d 693, 78 A.L.R.2d 1107 (Fla.App.1959); Russo v. Russo, 210 La. 853, 28 So.2d 455 (1946).
Appellant has not shown any prejudice resulting from the exclusion of spectators from the hearing.
The order appealed from awarded a fee to the wife’s attorneys. Appellee’s recollection is that there was an agreement. The trial court suggested submission of affidavits which, if uncontroverted, would furnish the basis of an award. There is no record of affidavits, any agreement or testimony supporting the award, so the order appealed from must be reversed on this point.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
LILES, C. J., and PIERCE, J., concur.
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State of Fla. ex rel. Gore Newspapers Co. & Margaret Ann Croxton v. The Honorable Robert W. Tyson, Jr., 313 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)…ed that such informal procedure is likely to shed more light upon the issue than would result from subjecting the child to examination and cross-examination (perhaps after coaching) in open court. . The decisions in Coggan v. Coggan, Fla. App.1968, 214 So. 2d 368, and Bloomer v. Bloomer, 1928, 197 Wis. 140, 221 N.W. 734, do not support the trial court’s action in the instant ease. The factual circumstances of those oases are substantially dissimilar from the instant ease as to render those decisions distingu…1 / 2
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Jette Schlapik v. Miles Schlapik, 329 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)…L.R.2d 10, 19. Under the record presented to us, we are unable to determine that the trial judge abused his very broad discretion in this matter. See the rule in Vilas v. Vilas, 1943, 153 Fla. 102, 13 So. 2d 807; and Coggan v. Coggan, Fla.App.1968, 214 So. 2d 368. AFFIRMED.…
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State of Fla. ex rel. Carey English v. The Honorable Robert L. McCRARY, Jr., 328 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)…lowing statement of the law: “The hearing is commonly in open court, but the court in its discretion may, in the absence of a statute requiring causes to be heard publicly, order the case to be heard privately.” In Coggan v. Coggan, Fla.App. (2d), 214 So. 2d 368 (1968), a divorce case, the Second District Court of Appeal held: “Appellant has not shown any prejudice resulting from the exclusion of spectators from the hearing.” By the above ruling the Second District Court of Appeal necessarily held that th…
Authorities Cited
- Zalka v. Zalka, 100 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 1958)
- Katiba v. Katiba, 110 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959)