CHARLES PARKER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Charles Parker appealed the trial court's summary denial of his motion for modification of sentence, filed nearly four and a half years after sentencing. The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding the order non-appealable and that the trial court properly denied the motion as untimely.
The appellate court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the order denying the motion for modification of sentence was not appealable. The court did not reach the merits of whether the motion was properly denied, though it noted that both the Public Defender and Attorney General agreed the trial court acted correctly.
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Statutory basis for the trial court's finding that Parker's motion filed nearly four and a half years after sentencing was untimely
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceParker was charged with uttering forged checks in 1959 and pleaded guilty without counsel. He was sentenced in April 1959, but these sentences were va…
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Charles Parker, appellant here, appeals to this Court an order entered by the trial Court summarily denying his “Motion for Modification of Sentence” filed almost four and a half years after imposition of sentence in a criminal case.
On February 3, 1959, Parker was charged in four separate informations filed in the Pinellas County Circuit Court for the offense of uttering forged checks.' On the following day a fifth information was filed charging him with another similar offense. On February 4, 1959, he entered pleas of guilty to all informations, but was not represented by counsel. On April 14, 1959, he was sentenced on each charge, still without counsel. On September 10, 1963, all the sentences were set aside and vacated under then existing Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1, F.S.A. ch. 924 Appendix. On November 14, 1963 he again appeared before the Court and, with counsel, again entered pleas of guilty to all informations. He was adjudged guilty and sentenced the same day.
On April 30, 1968, he filed a “Motion for Modification of Sentence”, which was summarily denied the same day by the trial Court. The motion complained essentially that the Division of Corrections1 had refused to give him credit for time he was incarcerated in the Polk County Jail following his escape from the State Road Prison, and the time he was laten incarcerated in the Pinellas County Jail prior to his resentencing.
In the order denying his “Motion for Modification” the trial Court based its ruling upon two grounds: (1) the motion was not “timely filed pursuant to the provisions of § 921.25 F.S. [F.S.A.],2 and (2) that the matter of allowing credit for time served in a jail or prison after Court sentence was a matter “within the jurisdiction of the Executive Department of government rather than the Judicial Department.”
Brief has been filed in this Court by the local Public Defender’s office on behalf of defendant “in accordance with the provisions of Anders v. [State of] California, [386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396], 18 L.Ed.2d 493, and Gossett v. State, Fla.App.1966, 191 So.2d 281”. The brief discusses two points of law: (1) whether the order appealed from is an appealable order, and (2) whether, assuming an appeal were allowable, the order was properly denied on the merits.
The brief filed by the Public Defender reviews with particularity the antecedent record facts of the case, and meticulously explores the law applicable to the two points discussed. With commendable candor, the brief concludes that both propositions should be decided adversely to Parker, namely, that the order to be reviewed here is not an appealable order, and (2) the trial Court correctly denied the Motion for Modification without hearing. Not surprisingly, the Attorney General on behalf of the State agrees with the Public Defender on both points.
We are happy to add our concurrence to this harmonious unanimity of thought, and accordingly ex mero motu dismiss the appeal upon the first ground mentioned.
ALLEN, Acting C. J., and MANN, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Hallman v. State, 343 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)…red evidence.” To begin with, insofar as the order appealed from denies that part of appellant’s motion seeking reduction of sentence, such order is a nonappealable order. This court is thus without jurisdiction to consider it. See Parker v. State, 214 So. 2d 632 (Fla.2d DCA 1968). Concerning that part of appellant’s motion seeking a writ of error coram nobis, it is well settled that permission to seek [*913] such a writ must be sought and granted by the appellate court which had previously entertained an a…
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Ziegler v. State, 380 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…n from the denial of a motion for a reduction of sentence filed under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.800. Hallman v. State, 371 So. 2d 482 (Fla.1979), affirming, 343 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Suggs v. State, 358 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); Parker v. State, 214 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968).1 Appeal dismissed. . We reject the appellant’s contention that jurisdiction is conferred by Fla.R.App.P. 9.140(b)(1)(C), which provides that a defendant may appeal from “orders entered after final judgment or finding of guilt,…
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Spaulding v. State, 93 So. 3d 473 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)…rit of certiorari. It is well established that an order denying a motion under rule 3.800(c) is not appealable. See Pillajo v. State, 60 So. 3d 565, 566 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); Smith v. State, 471 So. 2d 1347, 1348 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985);1 Parker v. State, 214 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968).2 The appellate courts, however, have recognized that some trial court errors that occur when considering rule 3.800(c) motions may be reviewed by peti [*475] tion for writ of common law certiorari. See Kwapil v. State, 44 So. 3d…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (U.S. 1967)
- Elliott G. Gossett and Mary C. Gossett v. State, 191 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)