EDWARD C. TIETIG, APPELLANT,
v.
DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, A GOVERNMENTAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, ET AL., APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1968-10-15
Nos. 68-189, 68-222
Before PEARSON, BARKDULL and HENDRY, JJ.
214 So. 2d 634 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1968) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Tietig appeals the dismissal of his tax refund complaint against Dade County, arguing that allegations showing voluntary tax payment constitute an affirmative defense that cannot support dismissal. The court affirms, holding that voluntary payment of taxes precludes recovery regardless of how the complaint is framed.


Holding

The court affirmed dismissal, holding that voluntary payment of taxes precludes recovery even if the mortgagee's payment was made through mistake or inadvertence. Allegations of voluntary payment constitute an affirmative defense properly asserted in a motion to dismiss, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend.


Key Quotes

“Plaintiff's principal ground for rehearing is that an affirmative defense appearing on the face of a Complaint may not be asserted as grounds for a Motion to Dismiss the complaint. Rule 1.110(d), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, provides otherwise.”

Establishes that affirmative defenses appearing on the face of a complaint may be grounds for dismissal under Florida procedural rules.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Tietig owned real property assessed for ad valorem taxes in 1967. His mortgagee paid the full assessed taxes voluntarily and without protest before Ti…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

By these consolidated appeals plaintiff seeks review of orders dismissing his complaint and denying his petition for rehearing and leave to amend the complaint.

Plaintiff filed suit against the defendants, the taxing authorities, complaining that certain of his real property had been illegally assessed. He sought to pay the county a sum less than that assessed and asked for an injunction prohibiting the county from collecting a greater sum. It was alleged in the complaint that all of the 1967 ad valorem taxes assessed against this property had been voluntarily paid by the mortgagee prior to the institution of the suit. It was further alleged that the payment was made through clerical mistake and inadvertence and was contrary to the instructions he had given to the mortgagee; that the defendants refused to return the money paid.

The trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that plaintiff’s complaint shows on its face a complete affirmative defense to plaintiff’s action. The petition for rehearing and motion for leave to amend were denied.

The grounds for the court’s holdings were set forth in its order. They are:

“(1) Plaintiff’s principal ground for rehearing is that an affirmative defense appearing on the face of a Complaint may not be asserted as grounds for a Motion to Dismiss the complaint. Rule 1.110(d), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, provides otherwise. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Petition for Rehearing be and the same is hereby denied.
“(2) Plaintiff has sought leave to amend his Complaint by withdrawing Paragraphs 6 and 9 thereof and substituting therefor a new Paragraph ó and an exhibit designated Exhibit A. Paragraph 9 of the Complaint shows that the mortgagee of Plaintiff’s property paid the assessed taxes in full and without protest before the present suit was filed. Plaintiff, appearing in pro persona at the hearing on the Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint did not deny the truth of the matters alleged in said Paragraph 9 of the Complaint. Instead, Plaintiff has sought to withdraw the allegations of said Paragraph 9 on the ground that these allegations are properly matters of affirmative defense and should be plead by Defendants in their answer. The proffered amendment itself alleges that the taxes on Plaintiff’s property were paid in full prior to suit being filed and is thus entirely consistent with the allegations of Paragraph 9 of the Complaint. Accordingly, it would serve no useful purpose to permit Plaintiff to amend his Complaint by withdrawing Paragraph 9 thereof, which he admits to be true, and to substitute the proferred amendment and justice does not require the Plaintiff be given leave to so amend his Complaint. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint be and the same is hereby denied.”

It is appellant’s contention that the allegations contained in Paragraph 9 of the original complaint do not set forth facts which, if true, are grounds for a complete affirmative defense and that the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion to amend. We find these contentions to be without merit. In State ex rel. Victor Chemical Works v. Gay, Fla.1954, 74 So.2d 560, 46 A.L.R.2d 1340, refund was denied for taxes paid under a statute held to be unconstitutional. Payment was held to have been voluntary even under those facts, and such holding precluded recovery.

In North Miami v. Seaway Corp., 1942, 151 Fla. 301, 9 So.2d 705, the money in question was paid pursuant to a tax levied on land after a judicial determination that *636the land was in fact not subject to the tax. The payment was held to have been voluntary and recovery precluded.

Therefore, we conclude that the order appealed from was correct and we affirm.

Affirmed.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Willig v. Blake, 358 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
    …ve defense upon which the trial court granted summary final judgment in their favor. See State ex rel. Victor Chemical Works v. Gay, 74 So. 2d 560 (Fla.1954); North Miami v. Seaway Corp., 151 Fla. 301, 9 So. 2d 705 (1942); and Tietig v. Dade County, 214 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968). Because the summary final judgment was correctly entered by the trial court, appellant’s petition for reconsideration was properly denied. Therefore, no other error having been made to appear, the order of the trial court denying…
  • Aquarius Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Markham, 442 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)
    …ve defense upon which the trial court granted summary final judgment in their favor. See State ex rel. Victor Chemical Works v. Gay, 74 So. 2d 560 (Fla.1954); North Miami v. Seaway Corp., 151 Fla. 301, 9 So. 2d 705 (1942); and Tietig v. Dade County, 214 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968). There is nothing in Willig to suggest that the taxpayer went through the administrative process as did the association. Moreover, the Revenue Collector of Broward County has never filed an answer in the trial court, alleging an…

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw