UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, APPELLANT,
v.
JOSE S. PORRAS, APPELLEE
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USAA appealed a summary judgment finding that an insured had uninsured motorists coverage under a New York-issued policy for an accident occurring in Florida, despite a policy provision limiting coverage to New York. The court affirmed, holding either that ambiguous policy language must be construed in favor of the insured or that the policy unambiguously provided such coverage.
The court affirmed that the insured had uninsured motorists coverage for the Florida accident. The court adopted an alternative holding: either the policy language was ambiguous and must be construed against the insurer, or the policy unambiguously provided coverage outside New York with New York statutory coverage inside the state.
“the policy being ambiguous and the facts not being in dispute, it was within the province of the trial judge to resolve the ambiguity as a matter of law”
Establishes the rule that ambiguous insurance policy language is construed by the trial court in the insured's favor
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceUSAA issued an insurance policy in New York to Porras that included uninsured motorists coverage with a premium of $3.00, referenced in Endorsement #6…
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The question involved in this cause is whether or not the appellee had, under an insurance policy issued in the State of New York, uninsured motorists coverage for an accident which occurred in Dade County, Florida. The following provisions are found in the policy: As to coverage, it reads as follows:
“Total Premium * * * $3.00 — Uninsured Motorists: See Endorsement #613 Attached.”
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The endorsement reads as follows:
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“It is agreed that such insurance as is afforded by the policy or by any endorsement used therewith, other than the New York Automobile Accident Indemnification Coverage, with respect- to damages which the insured shall become legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile, does not apply to any accident occurring within the State of New York.
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“1. Damages for Bodily Injury Caused by Uninsured Automobiles
“MVAIC will pay all sums which the insured or his legal representative shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an unin*750sured automobile because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom, hereinafter called ‘bodily injury’, sustained by the insured, caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured automobile; provided, for the purposes of this endorsement, determination as to whether the insured or such representative is legally entitled to recover such damages, and if so the amount thereof, shall be made by agreement between the insured or such representative and MVAIC or, if they fail to agree, by arbitration.
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“III. Territory
“This endorsement applies only to accidents which occur within the State of New York.”
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The trial judge held that there was coverage without the State of New York. We agree, and affirm either under the doctrine that the policy being ambiguous and the facts not being in dispute, it was within the province of the trial judge to resolve the ambiguity as a matter of law [New Amsterdam Casualty Company v. Addison, Fla.App.1964, 169 So.2d 877; Miller Electric Company of Florida v. Employers’ Liability Assurance Corporation, Fla.App. 1965, 171 So.2d 40; Financial Fire & Casualty Company v. Callaham, Fla.App.1967, 199 So.2d 529], or that by the very terms of the policy there was no ambiguity and that the insured had uninsured motorists coverage outside the State of New York and, within the State of New York, had coverage under a New York statute which created the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation. Therefore, we'affirm the trial judge in granting a summary judgment adjudicating coverage in favor of the insured.
We have examined the other point urged by the appellant and find this point not to be well taken, because same was not originally raised in the trial court. Oliva v. Baum, Fla.App.1967, 194 So.2d 319; Radiation, Inc. v. Campbell, Fla.App. 1967, 200 So.2d 192; Jackson v. Whitmire Construction Company, Fla.App.1967, 202 So.2d 861.
Therefore, for the reasons above stated, the summary final judgment here under review be and the same is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
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Ellenwood v. S. United Life Ins. Co., 373 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)…owed that no evidence of insurability was ever requested), and there is an ambiguity in the policy, it is within the province of the trial judge— not the jury — to resolve the ambiguity as a matter of law. Cf. United Services Auto. Assoc. v. Porras, 214 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968); New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Ad [*395] dison, 169 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964); United Services Auto. Asso’n. v. McCray, 348 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Under either theory the trial court should have granted a motion for dire…
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Rosetta Drisdom v. Guar. Tr. Life Ins. Co., 371 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…la.1978). It is generally for the court and not for the jury to determine the extent of coverage under an insurance policy. State Farm Fire & Casualty v. Lichtman, 227 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969); United Services Automobile Association v. Porras, 214 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968). The jury must resolve whether the insured’s loss falls within the terms of the policy. State Farm Fire & Casualty v. Lichtman, supra. Particularly where there is a latent ambiguity in the policy as distinguished from a patent amb…
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State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Lichtman, 227 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)…er of law, to determine the extent of coverage under an insurance policy. Miller Electric Company of Florida v. Employer’s Liability Assurance Corporation, Fla.App.1965, 171 So. 2d 40; United Services Automobile Association v. Porras, Fla. App.1968, 214 So. 2d 749; 18 Fla.Jur., Insurance, § 454; 44 Am.Jur.2d, Insurance, § 2064. But whether a certain set of facts exist to bring a loss to the insured within the terms of a policy is an issue to be determined by the trier of fact. Fireman’s Fund Indemnity Company…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- NEW Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Addison, 169 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)
- Miller Elec. Co. OF Fla. v. The Emp'rs' Liab. Assurance Corp., 171 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965)
- Fin. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Callaham, 199 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)
- Jackson v. Whitmire Constr. Co., Inc., 202 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)
- Radiation, Inc. v. Campbell, 200 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967)
- Oliva v. Baum, 194 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)
- United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Porras, 196 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)