JAMES RILEY, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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James Riley, Jr. appealed the denial of his motion to vacate a conviction for uttering a forged money order. The court affirmed the denial, holding that Riley had already raised substantially identical grounds in a prior motion that was denied and upheld on appeal, and that successive motions containing repetitious grounds should not be entertained.
The court held that the trial court properly denied the motion to vacate. Courts need not entertain successive motions containing repetitious grounds previously rejected, particularly where the prior denial was affirmed on appeal. Additionally, mere refusal by counsel to appeal does not constitute valid grounds for post-conviction relief without a showing of reversible error that might have supported reversal on appeal.
“Courts should be spared the harassment of successive motions by the same prisoner containing repetitious grounds.”
Establishes the court's policy against entertaining successive motions raising substantially identical claims previously rejected.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRiley was charged with altering and raising a money order from $2.00 to $12.00. He entered a plea of not guilty, changed it to guilty, then withdrew t…
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In this case appellant James Riley, Jr., appeals an order of the Pinellas County Circuit Court denying without hearing his motion to vacate, under former Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1, F.S.A. ch. 924 appendix, the judgment of conviction pre*767viously entered against him in a criminal case.
Riley was originally charged in an information with uttering a forged money order, specifically that he had altered and raised a money order from $2.00 to $12.00. With Court-appointed counsel he appeared in open Court and entered plea of not guilty. Later he changed his plea to guilty, and after that was permitted to withdraw his guilty plea and change it back to not guilty. On August 16, 1965, upon trial by jury, he was found guilty as charged and was thereafter sentenced to a term of imprisonment.
Riley later filed motion to vacate the sentence under Rule 1. His motion was denied on June 30, 1966, and on March 1, 1967, this Court upon appeal affirmed the trial Court. Thereafter, on February 2, 1968, Riley filed his present motion to vacate in the Circuit Court, and on February 14, 1968, the Circuit Judge again denied the motion. After Riley appealed said last order of denial to this Court, present counsel was appointed by the trial Court to represent him here.
The basis for the Circuit Court’s instant denial order is that Riley had already raised substantially, in a prior motion, the same grounds he was currently relying on, and which ground had already been determined adversely to him and such ruling upheld upon appeal. The record filed here in the instant appeal sustains such ruling.
The motion of June 27, 1966 relied upon the ground that his trial counsel appointed by the Court would not discuss or talk with him about appealing his conviction. This is virtually the identical ground raised in the present motion as the only basis for seeking post-conviction relief. The order here appealed was properly entered under authority of Walker v. State, Fla.App.1967, 201 So.2d 818; Colebrook v. State, Fla.App.1966, 191 So.2d 309; and Fields v. State, Fla.App.1967, 202 So.2d 226.
Particularly is this true where a prior denial upon substantially the same ground has been affirmed on appeal. Thompson v. State, Fla.App.1966, 187 So.2d 363. Courts should be spared the harassment of successive motions by the same prisoner containing repetitious grounds. Piehl v. State, Fla.App.1965, 173 So.2d 723.
Also, the current motion was insufficient upon its face. The mere fact that his trial counsel refused to take an appeal does not ipso facto constitute valid ground for later relief under former Rule 1. There must be a showing of existence of reversible error occurring during his trial which might have reasonably prompted a reversal on appeal. This Court has so heretofore held. See Milligan v. State, Fla.App.1967, 194 So.2d 663, and the Federal cases cited therein. No such showing was even attempted here.
The order appealed from is accordingly affirmed.
Affirmed.
LILES, C. J., and MANN, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Barnett v. State, 222 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)…se apparently all four District Courts are now uniform in the holding that such probable trial error must be alleged in the motion. This 2nd District Court so held in Milligan v. State, Fla.App.1967, 194 So. 2d 663, and Riley v. State, Fla.App.1968, 214 So. 2d 766. The 3rd District Court so held in Murray v. State, Fla.App.1966, 191 So. 2d 292, following Jackson v. State, Fla.App.1964, 166 So. 2d 194. The 4th District Court held accordingly in Nelson v. State, Fla.App.1968, 208 So. 2d 506. And the 1st Distric…
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Robertson v. State, 219 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969)…, this court went beyond DeMotte and aligned itself with the views of our sister appellate courts in Nelson v. State, supra; Jackson v. State, 166 So. 2d 194 (Fla.App.3d 1964); Milligan v. State, 194 So. 2d 663 (Fla.App.2d 1967); and Riley v. State, 214 So. 2d 766 (Fla. App.2d 1968). We think these cases reflect the better view, for to hold otherwise would be placing into motion quite needlessly the expensive judicial machinery paid for by the taxpayers to afford a full appellate review where no arguable reve…
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MAY v. State, 256 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971)…f of the same prisoner.” Under this quoted provision, the trial Court properly denied the second motion for relief which is the subject matter of the instant appeal. See Marshall v. State, Fla.App. 1969, 224 So. 2d 723; Riley v. State, Fla.App.1968, 214 So. 2d 766; Mitchell v. State, Fla.App. 1967, 203 So. 2d 676, cert. den. 392 U.S. 913, 88 S.Ct. 2073, 20 L.Ed.2d 1371; Mapp v. State, Fla.App. 1969, 224 So. 2d 431. The order appealed from is therefore— Affirmed. HOBSON and MANN, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Piehl v. State, 173 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965)
- Milligan v. State, 194 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)
- Carlton Lee Fields v. State, 202 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)
- Bobby Jones Garden Apts., Inc. v. The Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 202 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)
- Thompson v. State, 187 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)
- Colebrook v. State, 191 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)
- Walker v. State, 201 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)