LIBERTY EQUITIES CORPORATION, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
JOE'S CREEK INDUSTRIAL PARK, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1968-10-30
No. 68-377
ALLEN, A. C. J., and PIERCE, J., concur.
214 So. 2d 888 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1968) Negative Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

Liberty Equities leased land to Joe's Creek Industrial Park with purchase options. When Liberty threatened cancellation, Joe's Creek sought injunctive relief including a mandatory injunction requiring Liberty to convey property parcels to third-party purchasers. The appellate court reversed the mandatory injunction, holding that such relief disturbs the status quo and lacks the irreparable injury required for injunctive relief.


Holding

A temporary mandatory injunction requiring conveyance to third parties is not an appropriate preservation of the status quo. While a restraining order preserving the lease pending litigation is proper, a mandatory injunction compelling conveyance disturbs the status quo and lacks justification where the injury can be remedied by money damages and an adequate bond.


Key Quotes

“A mandatory injunction requiring conveyance to purchasers who are not parties and who cannot be compelled to reconvey disturbs the "status quo" although it is perfectly compatible with the flow of transactions in which these parties have been involved.”

Establishes the court's distinction between preserving status quo and mandatory injunctions requiring performance by non-parties

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Facts & Procedural History

Liberty Equities leased land to Joe's Creek Industrial Park for up to 99 years with options to purchase designated portions or all of the property. Li…

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Opinion of the Court
MANN, Judge.

MANN, Judge.

Appellant leased land to appellee for a maximum period of 99 years, with options to purchase designated portions or all on a basis specified in the lease and subsequent agreement. Threatened by notice of cancellation, appellee filed suit for injunctions restraining cancellation, requiring compliance with an option to purchase the entire property and compelling immediate conveyance of small parcels of land not corresponding exactly to the larger parcels subject to option, but like parcels appellant had theretofore released as appellee found customers. The trial court found that it would maintain the status quo to grant not only the restraining order but the “temporary” mandatory injunction.

We define “status quo” differently. To us the restraining order preserves the status quo and was properly entered. A mandatory injunction requiring conveyance to purchasers who are not parties and who cannot be compelled to reconvey disturbs the “status quo” although it is perfectly compatible with the flow of transactions in which these parties have been involved. Appellee has cited no case in which a temporary mandatory injunction compelling conveyance of property to third parties has been upheld. We need not hold that such a case is inconceivable, although we cannot conceive it. It suffices to point out that there is in this case no injury which money cannot assuage. See Fabisinski and Cowart, Injunctive Relief in Florida, 4 U.Fla.L.Rev. 571, 577 (1951); Zetrouer v. Zetrouer, 89 Fla. 253, 103 So. 625 (1925); Bowling v. National Convoy & Trucking Co., 101 Fla. 634, 135 So. 541 (1931); Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 212 So.2d 365 (Fla.App.1968). Annotation, 15 A.L.R.2d 213.

We have advanced the cause and determined it promptly so that the trial judge may, as the transcript indicates he was about to do when this appeal was taken, raise the bond to an amount adequate to protect appellant without considering the value of leasehold improvements and proceed to determine the issues. He did not abuse his discretion in denying appointment of a receiver.

*890Reversed in part and remanded with directions to dissolve the mandatory injunction and fix an appropriate bond; affirmed insofar as the order appealed from denied appointment of a receiver and restrained appellant from cancelling the lease pending this litigation.

ALLEN, A. C. J., and PIERCE, J., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • …nd Condominium Association, Inc., 383 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Oxford International Bank and Trust, Ltd. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 374 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Liberty Equities Corp. v. Joe’s Creek Industrial Park, 214 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968). The orders granting a motion for preliminary injunction and granting motion amending preliminary injunction are both REVERSED.…

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