SAM VANCE, SID LAURENCE, CLAUDE RIDGSBY, CRESTON THOMAS, AND J. CHARLES SULLIVAN, APPELLANTS,
v.
GEORGE RUPPEL, JOHN W. BONSEY, ET AL., AS AND CONSTITUTING THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA, ETC., ET AL., APPELLEES
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Florida Supreme Court reversed a circuit court decision upholding Chapter 67-719, a state statute that regulated constable compensation in counties with populations between 350,000 and 385,000. The Court found the statute unconstitutional as an improper local act that violated Article III, Sections 20 and 21 of the Florida Constitution because the population classification lacked a reasonable relationship to the statute's purpose.
Chapter 67-719 is unconstitutional as a local act improperly regulating county officer fees because the population classification lacks a reasonable relationship to the statute's subject matter and public purpose. The Court reversed the Circuit Court's dismissal and remanded for further proceedings.
“We conclude Ch. 67-719 is in effect a local act which attempts to regulate the fees of county officers and as such is violative of the requirements of Article III, Sections 20 and 21 of the State Constitution, F.S.A.”
States the core holding that the statute violates the Florida Constitution's prohibition on local acts regulating county officer fees.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceChapter 67-719 is a population-based statute affecting constables in Florida counties with 350,000 to 385,000 inhabitants. The statute required all co…
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This cause is before us on direct appeal to review a final order of the Circuit Court for Pinellas County, Florida, directly passing on the validity of a statute of this state. The cause was initiated by Pinellas County Constables, Appellants, upon a complaint alleging Ch. 67-719, Florida Statutes 1967, to be unconstitutional. In its final order dismissing the complaint, the Circuit Court specifically upheld the constitutionality of Ch. 67-719.
Chapter 67-719 is a population act affecting the office of constable in certain counties having a population not less than three hundred fifty thousand and not more than three hundred eighty-five thousand inhabitants. In such counties the act provides that all emoluments of the office of constable, including all money received or credits due for services performed, shall become the property of the county and that constables in such counties shall be compensated by salary only. In all counties within the population classification of Ch. 67-719 and having five justices of the peace districts, the act specifically fixes the salary of constables of each of said districts at one dollar per annum. Except for the salaries provided, the act prohibits the county from providing a budget or other expenditure of funds in connection with or relative to the office of constable. The act further designates a procedure of reporting and accounting by constables and specifically repeals Ch. 63-969, Florida Statutes 1963.
We conclude Ch. 67-719 is in effect a local act which attempts to regulate the fees of county officers and as such is violative of the requirements of Article III, Sections 20 and 21 of the State Constitution, F.S.A. While on occasion we have sustained, as general laws, population acts, in all such instances we have been careful to adhere to the principle that the population classification bear a reasonable relation to the subject matter of the act and the public purpose to be effected thereby. See Budget Commission of Pinellas County v. Blocker (Fla.1952), 60 So.2d 193; Walker v. Pendarvis (Fla.1961), 132 So.2d 186. In the present case we fail to perceive existence of the necessary relationship between the classification factors involved and the purpose sought to be accomplished by Ch. 67-719. We denote no reason justifying the distinctive regulation accorded *311constables’ salaries falling within the population scheme here employed.
In disposing of the present case as stated above, it is unnecessary for us to express any view as to the constitutionality of a legislative act which indirectly but effectively eliminates a constitutionally ordained county office in a manner different from the method provided in Section 11, Article V of the State Constitution or concerning the validity of a legislative act regulating compensation of a county officer that is neither of uniform operation throughout the state nor consistent with general laws relating to compensation of such officers. Musleh v. Marion County (Fla.1967), 200 So.2d 168.
The order appealed from is reversed and the cause remanded to the Circuit Court of Pinellas County, Florida, for further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision.
CALDWELL, C. J., and ROBERTS, DREW, THORNAL and ERVIN, JJ., concur.
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Lewis v. Judge Chas. C. Mathis, Jr., 345 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1977)…is for the classification to be held constitutional. State ex rel. Juvenal v. Neville, 123 Fla. 745, 167 So. 650 (1936); Levine v. Bailey, 124 Fla. 241, 168 So. 12 (1936); Waybright v. Duval County, 142 Fla. 875, 196 So. 430 (1940); Vance v. Ruppel, 215 So. 2d 309 (Fla.1968). The classification based upon population must also be potentially applicable to other political subdivisions of the state with the same population. Ex parte Wells, 21 Fla. 280 (1885); Coral Gables v. Crandon, 157 Fla. 71, 25 So. 2d 1 (19…
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City OF Miami Beach v. Frankel, 363 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 1978)…of local application is a law that uses a classification scheme— based on population or some other criterion — so that its application is restricted to particular localities. See, e. g., Lewis v. Mathis, 345 So. 2d 1066 (Fla.1977); Vance v. Ruppel, 215 So. 2d 309 (Fla.1968); County of Dade v. City of North Miami Beach, 109 So. 2d 362 (Fla.1959). It is clear on the face of this statute that it is a general law applicable statewide. It contains no classification scheme. No factual inquiry was needed to determi…
Authorities Cited
- Basil J. Walker v. Pendarvis, 132 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 1961)
- Budget Comm'n of Pinellas Cnty. v. Blocker, 60 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1952)
- Musleh v. Marion Cnty., 200 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 1967)