ANTHONY KERNJACK AND AGNES M. KERNJACK, APPELLANTS,
v.
JOE COTTON REALTY CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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A broker is not entitled to a commission when the seller withdraws from negotiations before the broker secures the buyer's acceptance of the seller's terms.
A broker found a buyer for a seller's property. The initial proposed contract contained terms unacceptable to the seller. The seller's attorney propos…
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Cotton’s counsel contends that his client has earned this commission twice. The Circuit Court concluded that he had earned it once. The countdown continues.
Kernjack told Cotton that he wanted to sell some acreage in Collier County at a certain price. Cotton promptly found a purchaser at Kernjack’s price, but the proposed contract provided for release of non-contiguous parcels for a specified higher sum per acre, the excess to be treated as a prepayment on the next accruing installments. So far, no earned' comission: the conditions as well as the price must be acceptable. McAllister Hotel, Inc. v. Porte, 98 So.2d 781 (Fla.1957).
Kernjack’s attorney wrote that the deal would be acceptable if the released parcels were contiguous, and proposing other details which would make the proposition acceptable to Kernjack. The following day Cotton called Kernjack directly and told him that his buyer might not accept the terms proposed. This conversation, by the uncontradicted testimony, ended in Kern-jack’s getting angry and calling the deal off. That same day Cotton secured the buyer’s assent to the conditions proposed by Kernjack and forwarded a deposit and proposed contract signed by the buyer.
No sale ever resulted. This is not a case in which the seller bypasses the broker, like Mellet v. Henry, 108 So.2d 69 (Fla.App.1959). It is not a case of bad faith termination of a written brokerage agreement, like Alex D. Smith Real Estate v. Gables Venetian Waterways, Inc., 98 So.2d 372 (Fla.App.1957). It is a case in which a broker claims a commission for finding a purchaser ready, willing and able to buy on terms acceptable to the seller, as in McAllister Hotel, Inc. v. Porte, supra. But by the time Cotton got the buyer in a mood to accept Kernjack’s terms they were no longer acceptable to Kernjack and Cotton admits knowing it. See 3 Fla.L. & Prac., Brokers and Brokerage, § 11.
Reversed and remanded for entry of judgment for the defendant.
LILES, C. J., and HOBSON, J., concur.
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Fenton v. Bancroft Hotel Assocs., Inc., 265 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)…; Glendon v. Pyne, 275 Mass. 528, 176 N.E. 602. The conditions of the sale as well as the price must be acceptable in order to justify a broker’s commission. McAllister Hotel, Inc. v. Porte, supra; Kernjack v. Joe Cotton Realty Corp., Fla. App.1968, 216 So. 2d 18. Appellants’ contention that the appellee’s desire for the sale of the corporate stock prevented the eventual consummation of the transaction is without merit. The attorney representing the prospective purchasers stated that the new condition was n…
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Sherman v. Lynch, 242 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)…aser was in fact a “purchaser, ready, willing, and able” to buy under the test set forth by the Supreme Court in the case of McAllister Hotel, Inc. v. Porte, Fla.1957, 98 So. 2d 781. See also: Kernjack v. Joe Cotton Realty Corporation, Fla.App.1968, 216 So. 2d 18; Froedtert v. Haines, 5th Cir. 1944, 142 F. 2d 338; Skene [*801] v. Carayanis, 103 Conn. 708, 131 A. 497; Herbert v. Jaffe, 281 Mass. 202, 183 N.E. 259. By cross-assignment, the appellee has duly preserved his point on the alleged error of the tria…
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Langfitt v. Poitras, 41 Fla. Supp. 36 (Indian River Cty. Cir. Ct. 1974)…il of the sale, i.e., the amount to be paid upon the execution of the contract, was never agreed upon by all of the parties. Fentos v. Bancroft Hotel Associates, Inc., 3 DCA 1972, 265 So. 2d 67; Kernjack v. Joe Cotton Realty Corporation, 2 DCA 1968, 216 So. 2d 18; and McAllister Hotel v. Porte, Supreme Court of Florida, 1957, 98 So. 2d 781. [*39] In addition this is a case where we have a specific agreement concerning the payment of a broker’s commission. The broker’s agreement (plaintiff’s exhibit 5 in evi…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- McALLISTER Hotel, Inc. v. Porte, 98 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 1957)
- Mellet v. Henry, 108 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)
- Alex D. Smith Real Est., Inc. v. Gables Venetian Waterways, Inc., 98 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 3d DCA 1957)