WILLIE LEE DAVIS, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1968-11-05
No. 68-122
Before HENDRY and SWANN, JJ., and WHITE, JOSEPH S. (Ret.) Associate Judge.
216 So. 2d 28 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1968) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

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Synopsis

Willie Lee Davis was convicted of grand larceny for stealing 40 bushels of mangoes valued at over $100. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the conviction, finding that the evidence of ownership was insufficient as a matter of law because Mitchell could not reliably identify detached mangoes as his own given the prevalence of mango trees along Florida's east coast.


Holding

The Court held that Mitchell's testimony regarding identification of the mangoes did not meet the test of substantial evidence necessary to support a conviction for grand larceny because it is unreasonable for an owner to reliably identify 40 bushels of detached mangoes as his own given the hundreds of mango trees throughout the east coast of Florida.


Key Quotes

“The allegation of ownership of property is a material and essential element of the crime of larceny, and this must be proven to support a conviction.”

Establishes that ownership is a necessary element that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt

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Facts & Procedural History

Ed Mitchell owned more than one hundred bearing mango trees and discovered approximately 75 bushels of fruit had been stolen. He reported the theft to…

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Opinion of the Court
WHITE, JOSEPH S. (Ret.) Associate Judge.

WHITE, JOSEPH S. (Ret.) Associate Judge.

This appeal brings for review a judgment convicting appellant of grand larceny. The charge involved the theft of “Forty (40) Bushels of Mangoes” valued at “more than ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($100.00)” the “goods and chattels of one ED MITCHELL”.

The question before the court concerns the sufficiency of the proof to establish ownership of the fruit.

Ed Mitchell had more than one hundred bearing mango trees. He discovered that approximately 75 bushels of fruit had been removed from his trees. He reported the theft to a nearby packing house and requested that they keep a lookout for it. Shortly thereafter Mitchell was notified that the packing house had “some fruit that looks like what you had.” It had been purchased from the defendant. The fruit was pointed out to Mitchell and he *29identified it as belonging to him. He testified that in the process of making identification he inquired of other growers “to see if they lost any fruit at the same time, and they had not.” Thus it appears that Mitchell relied on something more than the bare appearance of the fruit.

The allegation of ownership of property is a material and essential element of the crime of larceny, and this must be proven to support a conviction. State v. Anders (Fla.1952), 59 So.2d 776.

There are many hundreds of mango trees throughout the counties along the east coast of Florida. It is contrary to common sense and reason for an owner of a few of these trees, who has only casually observed his fruit as it hung upon the trees, to be able to identify 40 bushels of mangoes as they later lay in a packing house, as being that particular fruit. It is our conclusion that testimony to this effect simply does not meet the test of “substantial evidence”, necessary to support conviction for crime. See Kilbee v. State, Fla.1951, 53 So.2d 533 (alleged theft of hogs); Maddox v. State, Fla.1948, 38 So.2d 58.

The evidence here creates a strong suspicion of guilt, but a mere suspicion, no matter how great, does not warrant a finding of guilt. Ellison et al. v. State, 1934, 115 Fla. 789, 156 So. 123.

Reversed.

SWANN, Judge

(dissenting).

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I believe the record reflects competent, substantial evidence upon which the trier of facts could determine that the ownership of the mangoes had been sufficiently established. It is no more, or less, difficult to sufficiently establish the identity of mangoes than it would be to establish the identity of fish, grapefruit, oranges, tomatoes or many other fruits and vegetables. If, as here, the owner of the fruit specifically and definitely identified the fruit as belonging to him and explained the reasons why he was able to specifically identify this fruit, I would uphold the decision of the trial court judge who had an opportunity to see and hear the witnesses and to examine their demeanor and credibility in person.

I, therefore, dissent.

Dissent
SWANN, Judge

SWANN, Judge

(dissenting).

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I believe the record reflects competent, substantial evidence upon which the trier of facts could determine that the ownership of the mangoes had been sufficiently established. It is no more, or less, difficult to sufficiently establish the identity of mangoes than it would be to establish the identity of fish, grapefruit, oranges, tomatoes or many other fruits and vegetables. If, as here, the owner of the fruit specifically and definitely identified the fruit as belonging to him and explained the reasons why he was able to specifically identify this fruit, I would uphold the decision of the trial court judge who had an opportunity to see and hear the witnesses and to examine their demeanor and credibility in person.

I, therefore, dissent.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Boswer v. State, 265 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
    …not sufficient to measure up to that degree of proof which is required to establish guilt. The evidence here creates a strong suspicion of guilt, but a mere suspicion, no matter how great, does not warrant a conviction. Davis v. State, Fla.App.1968, 216 So. 2d 28. Therefore, the judgment and sentence are reversed. Reversed.…
  • Thomas v. State, 216 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
    …be said to do is raise a suspicion that the appellant was guilty of aiding in the concealment. But a suspicion of guilt, even one greater than that present in the case before us, does not warrant a finding of guilt. See Davis v. State, Fla.App.1968, 216 So. 2d 28 [filed November 5, 1968]. The judgment and sentence are reversed with directions to discharge the defendant. . “Whoever buys, receives or aids in the concealment of stolen money, goods or property, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall be pu…
  • Kessler v. State, 227 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)
    …o support the judgment of conviction of grand larceny. We therefore reverse that judgment and remand the cause with directions to discharge the appellant from custody. Cf. Rollins v- State, Fla.App.1968, 211 So. 2d 861; Davis v. State, Fla.App.1968, 216 So. 2d 28. Reversed and remanded with directions.…

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