THOMAS
v.
MARYLAND

U.S. | 1985-03-25
No. 84-5943
with whom Justice Brennan joins,
470 U.S. 1088 Supreme Court of the United States (1985) Positive Treatment
Cited by 34 cases
Dissent
Justice Marshall,

Justice Marshall,

with whom Justice Brennan joins,

dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is under all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, I would vacate the judgment of the Maryland Court of Appeals insofar as it left undisturbed the death sentence imposed in this case. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). However, even if I believed that the death penalty could constitutionally be imposed under certain circumstances, I would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence imposed here.

To my mind, the Constitution requires that the State bear the burden of proving that a death sentence is appropriate in a given case. In two ways, the Maryland statute precludes this allocation of the burden of proof. First, it places on the defendant the burden of convincing the sentencer that mitigating evidence outweighs aggravating evidence, and it requires that a death sentence be imposed whenever aggravating factors are not outweighed. Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, § 413(h)(1982). The statute thereby places on the defendant the burden of proving that which is, under the existing statute, the ultimate question. Second, by requiring that death be the sentence whenever aggravating factors are not outweighed, the statute prevents the sentencer from making what to my mind must be the ultimate inquiry: whether death is the appropriate sentence in a given defendant’s case. For the reasons I stated earlier this Term in Stebbing v. Maryland, 469 U. S. 900 (1984) (dissenting from denial of certiorari), I believe that such a statute is unconstitutional, and I therefore dissent from the Court’s refusal to hear this case.

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Cited By (33 total)

  • Rogers v. State, 511 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1987)
    …0, 541 (Fla.1951). However, we again find the error harmless since Reynolds was one of three witnesses testifying to McDer-mid’s alleged statements that Rogers was not the murderer. See Parker v. State, 458 So. 2d 750, 754 (Fla.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1088, 105 S.Ct. 1855, 85 L.Ed.2d 152 (1985). [*533] We find no error in Rogers’ ninth contention that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized from his home and business. Nor is there merit to the tenth issue on appeal whe…
  • Archer v. State, 613 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1993)
    …wful act. Coston v. State, 139 Fla. 250, 253-54, 190 So. 520, 522 (1939); Provenzano v. State, 497 So. 2d 1177 (Fla.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1024, 107 S.Ct. 1912, 95 L.Ed.2d 518 (1987); Parker v. State, 458 So. 2d 750 (Fla.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1088, 105 S.Ct. 1855, 85 L.Ed.2d 152 (1985). Bonifay testified that he knew neither of the clerks and that he did not know that he killed the wrong one until Archer told him. Archer created the situation, and the victim’s death was a natural and foreseea…
  • Lovette v. State, 636 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 1994)
    …eign to, the common design’ of the original felonious collaboration may not be used to implicate the nonparticipant in the act.” Parker v. State, 458 So. 2d 750, 752 (Fla.1984) (quoting Bryant v. State, 412 So. 2d 347, 349 (Fla.1982)), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1088, 105 S.Ct. 1855, 85 L.Ed.2d 152 (1985). Felons, however, are generally responsible for the acts of their co-felons. Adams v. State, 341 So. 2d 765 (Fla.1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878, 98 S.Ct. 232, 54 L.Ed.2d 158 (1977). As perpetrators of an…

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