JOE YOUNG, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The appellate court affirmed the denial of a motion to vacate a guilty plea, finding that the defendant was adequately informed of the consequences of his plea and was not coerced.
No, the defendant's guilty plea was not coerced, and he was fully aware of the consequences. Therefore, the denial of his motion to vacate the sentence was proper.
“This is clearly refuted by the record.”
Establishes that the court found evidence contradicting the defendant's claims.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendant was charged with forgery, represented by a public defender, and pleaded guilty. He later filed a motion to vacate his sentence, alleging…
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Appellant-defendant was informed against and charged with forgery of an endorsement in the Criminal Court of Record of Hillsborough County. He was represented by the public defender and entered a plea of guilty at arraignment. On May 16, 1968, defendant filed a motion to vacate sentence under CrPR 1.850, 33 F.S.A., which was denied by the trial judge. This appeal followed.
*498Defendant charges that he was coerced into pleading guilty and did not know the consequences of his plea. This is clearly refuted by the record. The judge at arraignment went into great detail to explain to the defendant the consequences of such a plea. The judge advised the defendant that he could receive as much as ten years in State prison and again asked the defendant if he was sure this was the plea he wished to enter.
Following this thorough questioning and explanation by the trial judge the defendant still chose to plead guilty, and we affirm the trial judge’s denial of defendant’s motion under Rule 1.850.
LILES, C. J., and ALLEN and MANN, JJ., concur.
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Mikenas v. State, 460 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1984)…ond point, the law is that a plea of guilty must be voluntarily made by one competent to know the consequences of that plea and must not be induced by promises, threats or coercion. Hooper v. State, 232 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970); Young v. State, 216 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968); and Reddick v. State, 190 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966). The record shows that appellant’s plea was not the result of promises, threats or coercion. As for appellant’s third point, due process requires that a court accepting a g…
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Dawson v. State, 224 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)…that he would proceed with the motions to suppress and yet the appellant abandoned these motions. The lower court correctly concluded that the record conclusively showed that the guilty pleas were entered voluntarily. Young v. State, Fla.App.1968, 216 So. 2d 497; Moore v. State, Fla.App.1968, 216 So. 2d 766; and Haywood v. State, Fla.App.1969, 218 So. 2d 242. Oral argument is dispensed with as serving no useful purpose pursuant to Rule 3.10(e) F.A.R., 32 F.S.A. Affirmed. MANN and McNULTY, JJ., concur.…
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Frizzell v. State, 220 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed on authority of Haywood v. State (Fla.App.2d 1969), 218 So. 2d 242; Moore v. State (Fla.App.2d 1968), 216 So. 2d 766; and Young v. State (Fla.App.2d 1968), 216 So. 2d 497. HOBSON, A. C. J., and PIERCE and McNULTY, JJ., concur.…