HENRY PRESHA, ALIAS HARRY PRESHA, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1968-12-20
No. 68-117
ALLEN, Acting C. J., and HOBSON and MANN, JJ., concur.
216 So. 2d 790 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1968) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Holding

The appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for credit time for pre-sentencing incarceration.


Facts & Procedural History

The defendant was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to prison. While awaiting trial and sentencing, he was incarcerated for fifteen months. He s…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, defendant below, appeals the order of the trial court denying his Motion to Vacate and Set Aside Judgment and Sentence under Florida Criminal Procedure Rule 1.850, 33 F.S.A.

Appellant was informed against, tried and convicted for the crime of manslaughter. The trial court sentenced him to a term in prison of six months to ten years. While awaiting trial on the charge of manslaughter and sentencing on the subsequent conviction, appellant was incarcerated for approximately fifteen months in the county jail.

In his motion under Rule 1.850 F.C.P.R. appellant seeks credit time for the fifteen months he was imprisoned before his actual sentence began. In his appeal he alleges that he was not given credit time on his sentence for the previous fifteen months. He further alleges that it was error for the trial court to deny his motion and fail to give him credit time.

Under the laws of this State it is discretionary with the trial judge as to whether or not credit time should be given. The discretion of the trial judge will not be overturned unless it is clearly shown that the trial court has abused its discretion. No showing of abuse has been demonstrated by the appellant nor does the record reflect such.

*791On the contrary, in the trial court’s order denying appellant’s motion it is specifically stated:

“ * * * and the same being considered by this Court and this Court finding that this Court had previously taken into consideration, the confinement of the Defendant while awaiting trial and having disposed of said question in the way the Court deemed proper, * * * ”

It appears from the record on appeal that the trial court did properly exercise its discretion. Therefore, finding no merit to appellant’s argument, we affirm the ruling of the trial court denying his motion under Rule 1.850 F.C.P.R. See Florida Statutes § 921.161, F.S.A., and Perez v. Wainwright, 164 So.2d 823, (Fla.1964).

Affirmed.

ALLEN, Acting C. J., and HOBSON and MANN, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Green, 547 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 1989)
    …e judge's discretion whether to award a defendant credit for the time served in jail prior to being sentenced. § 921.161, Fla.Stat. (1963). Miller v. State, 270 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972), cert. denied, 276 So. 2d 170 (Fla.1973); Presha v. State, 216 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968). The statute was later amended to provide that “the court imposing a sentence shall allow a defendant credit for all of the time he spent in the county jail before sentence.” Thereafter, in State v. Jones, 327 So. 2d 18, 25 (Fla.1…
  • Herschel Lee DeLOACH v. State, 232 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970)
    …with emphasis on the “possibility for rehabilitation”. But appellate Courts are concerned only with the legality of sentence, not the “philosophy” or the discretionary imposition of sentence confided to trial Courts. Presha v. State, Fla.App.1968, 216 So. 2d 790; Darby v. State, Fla.App.1968, 216 So. 2d 29; Davis v. State, Fla.1960, 123 [*766] So. 2d 703; Le Prell v. State, Fla.App.1960, 124 So. 2d 18; Infante v. State, Fla.App.1967, 197 So. 2d 542; Stanford v. State, Fla.1959, 110 So. 2d 1. A reviewing Co…
  • Anderson v. Louie L. Wainwright, 267 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)
    …Ordered pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed here in May S, 1972 is denied. See Miles v. State, Fla.App. 1968, 214 So. 2d 101; Albury v. State, Fla. App.1971, 246 So. 2d 141 and Presha v. State, Fla.App.1968, 216 So. 2d 790.…

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