GREEN

v.

SCHWARZER, U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE

Citator

Cited By (13 total)

• Torres v. Superintendent OF the Police OF Puerto RICO, 893 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1990)
  …traightforward reasoning. The accrual period for a Section 1983 action begins when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action. Marrapese v. Rhode Island, 749 F. 2d 934, 936 (1st Cir.1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 921, 106 S.Ct. 252, 88 L.Ed.2d 259 (1985). In this case, plaintiffs learned of their dismissal on June 18, 1987. Therefore, to have a timely cause of action, the plaintiffs had to file their federal claim by June 19, 1988. They failed to comply with the…
• United States v. Campbell, 491 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2007)
  …oncurrently and to impose a fine of only $6,000 demonstrates considerable leniency and restraint. See, e.g., United States v. Tafoya, 757 F. 2d 1522, 1530 (5th Cir.) (upholding a sentence totaling six years on two counts of tax fraud), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 921, 106 S.Ct. 252, 88 L.Ed.2d 259 (1985). Campbell further argues that the district court failed to properly consider the central mandate of the key sentencing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2000), as well as the factors addressed in § 3553 that are inde…
• Rivera-Muriente v. Agosto-Alicea, 959 F.2d 349 (1st Cir. 1992)
  …ual period in a section 1983 case ordinarily starts when the plaintiff knows, or has reason to know, of the injury on which the action is based. See Street, 936 F. 2d at 40; Marrapese v. Rhode Island, 749 F. 2d 934, 936 (1st Cir.1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 921, 106 S.Ct. 252, 88 L.Ed.2d 259 (1985). III. Analysis A. It is readily evident, based on the foregoing, that the key question in this case is temporal: when did Rivera know, or have reason to know, that he had been deprived of his employment with…