CITY OF WATSEKA ET AL.
v.
ILLINOIS PUBLIC ACTION COUNCIL ET AL.

U.S. | 1987-01-20
No. 86-631
with whom The Chief Justice and Justice O’Connor join,
479 U.S. 1048 Supreme Court of the United States (1987) Caution
Cited by 10 cases
Dissent
Justice White,

[*1049] Justice White,

with whom The Chief Justice and Justice O’Connor join,

dissenting.

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held in this case that a city ordinance limiting door-to-door soliciting to the hours between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Saturday, violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 796 F. 2d 1547 (1986).

It is undisputed that the ordinance is content neutral. The purpose of the ordinance is to protect citizens’ privacy and to prevent crime, obviously legitimate governmental objectives as the Court of Appeals recognized. The Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that the ordinance im-permissibly restricted First Amendment activities because the city had less restrictive alternatives to accomplish its objectives. We have held, however, that a time, place, and manner restriction is valid if it is narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest and leaves open ample alternative channels for communication of the information, and we have not imposed the requirement that the restriction be the least restrictive means available. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U. S. 288, 293-294 (1984); see also Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U. S. 641, 657 (1984) (“The less-restrictive-alternative analysis . . . has never been a part of the inquiry into the validity of a time, place, and manner regulation. It is enough that the ... restriction substantially serves the Government’s legitimate ends”) (opinion of White, J.).

Because the decision below departs from this standard, I would note probable jurisdiction.

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  • Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (U.S. 1989)
    …, like Boos, is a strict-scrutiny case; even the dissent does not argue that strict scrutiny is applicable to time, place, or manner regulations. Our summary affirmance of Watseka v. Illinois Public Action Council, 796 F. 2d 1547 (CA7 1986), aff’d, 479 U. S. 1048 (1987), is not to the contrary. Although the Seventh Circuit in that case did adopt the least-restrictive-alternative approach, see 796 F. 2d, at 1553-1554, its judgment was also supported by the alternative grounds that the regulation at issue did…
  • Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (U.S. 1988)
    …1099, 940 and 941. Compare In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Morganstern), 771 F. 2d 143 (CA6) (en banc), cert. denied, 474 U. S. 1033 (1985); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (85-W-71-5), 784 F. 2d 857 (CA8 1986), cert. dism’d sub nom. See v. United States, 479 U. S. 1048 (1987); United States v. Malis, 737 F. 2d 1511 (CA9 1984); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Vargas), 727 F. 2d 941 (CA10), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 819 (1984), which have refused to recognize a Fifth Amendment privilege, with United States v. Antonio J.…
  • BAY Area Peace Navy v. United States, 914 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1990)
    …munication.1 The government bears the burden of proving that the “narrowly tailored” and “alternative communication” prongs are satisfied. City of Watseka v. Illinois Public Action Council, 796 F. 2d 1547, 1551 (7th Cir.1986), aff'd without opinion, 479 U.S. 1048, 107 S.Ct. 919, 93 L.Ed.2d 972 (1987). Cf. Community For Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 293 n. 5, 104 S.Ct. at 3069 n. 5. (“[I]t is common to place the burden upon the Government to justify im-pingements on First Amendment interests”). The dist…

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