RAY
v.
UNITED STATES
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Ray was convicted of drug conspiracy and two counts of drug possession with intent to distribute, receiving concurrent prison sentences but separate monetary assessments under federal law on each count. The Supreme Court held that because the monetary assessments were imposed on each conviction independently, the sentences were not truly concurrent, and therefore the Court of Appeals erred in declining to review the second possession conviction under the concurrent sentence doctrine. The case was remanded for the appellate court to consider the defendant's challenge to that conviction.
[1] The concurrent sentence doctrine permits a court of appeals to avoid deciding a moot conviction when the sentence on that conviction is served concurrently with a valid s…
[2] A monetary assessment imposed under 18 U.S.C. …
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Per Curiam.
Petitioner was found guilty of one count of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, and two counts of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. He was sentenced to concurrent 7-year prison terms on all three counts, and to concurrent special parole terms of five years on the two possession counts. The Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner ’s conspiracy conviction and one of his possession convictions. United States v. Sandoval, 791 F. 2d 929 (CA5 1986) (judg. order). Applying the so-called “concurrent sentence doctrine,” the court declined to review the second possession conviction because the sentences on the two possession counts were concurrent. We granted certiorari to review the role of the concurrent sentence doctrine in the federal courts. 479 U. S. 960 (1986).
It now appears, however, that petitioner is not in fact serving concurrent sentences. Title 18 U. S. C. § 3013 (1982 ed., Supp. Ill) provides that district courts shall assess a monetary charge “on any person convicted of an offense against the United States.” Pursuant to this section, the District Court imposed a $50 assessment on each count, in addition to the concurrent prison and parole terms, for a total of $150. Since petitioner’s liability to pay this total depends on the validity of each of his three convictions, the sentences are not concurrent. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore vacated, and the cause is remanded to that court so that it may consider petitioner’s challenge to his second possession conviction.
It is so ordered.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (30 total)
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United States v. Fagan, 821 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1987)…purposes of the concurrent sentence doctrine, so that we are obliged to review all assigned errors as to that count (as we have done) notwithstanding that its sentence is otherwise concurrent as respects other counts. Ray v. United States, - U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2093, 95 L.Ed.2d 693 (1987). But the bare possibility that this $50 assessment was improperly imposed does not raise the spectre of manifest miscarriage of justice so as to dispense with the rule that only assigned errors are considered on appeal. We f…
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United States v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 1403 (10th Cir. 1990)…r, the district court imposed a $50 special assessment on each count, in addition to the concurrent prison and parole terms, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3013 (1988). The concurrent sentence doctrine, therefore, could not apply. See Ray v. United States, 481 U.S. 736, 107 S.Ct. 2093, 95 L.Ed.2d 693 (1987). . The defendants also attack the government’s evidence of lack of registration on two fronts. First, defendants argue that the certificates of non-registration, dated September 12, 1988, are not competent pro…1 / 2
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Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292 (U.S. 1996)…rict court to impose a $50 special assessment for every conviction, and that such an assessment was imposed on both convictions in this case. As long as § 3013 stands, a second conviction will amount to a second punishment. Cf. Ray v. United States, 481 U. S. 736, 737 (1987) (per curiam) (presence of $50 assessment precludes application of “concurrent sentence doctrine”). The Government urges us not to rely on the assessment, however, pointing out that petitioner did not challenge it below, and noting that t…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- In re Miesbauer, 479 U.S. 960 (U.S. 1986)
- Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fink et ux., 479 U.S. 960 (U.S. 1986)