STATE, EX REL. LOUIS MORENCO,
v.
NATHAN MAYO, AS STATE PRISON CUSTODIAN, AND L. F. CHAPMAN, AS STATE PRISON SUPERINTENDENT
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In this habeas corpus proceeding, the Florida Supreme Court addressed whether a state board of pardons can revoke a six-month parole before expiration when the parole order explicitly reserves the board's right to cancel it. The court held that the board retained discretionary authority to revoke the parole at any time based on the express language of the parole order.
The State Board of Pardons retained the discretionary right to revoke the parole at any time because the parole order expressly limited the parole period "until otherwise ordered by the Board." The petitioner's contention that the board lacked this authority was without merit, and the prisoner was properly remanded to the custody of the prison officials.
“by the express terms of the order the Board of Pardons limited the extent of the period of parole "until otherwise ordered by the Board." Therefore, the Board of Pardons reserved the right to cancel the parole at any time.”
Establishes that the parole order's express language gave the board discretionary authority to revoke the parole before the six-month period ended.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLouis Morenco was paroled by the State Board of Pardons for six months on March 18, 1936, under the care and custody of Reverend C. W. Duke in Tampa, …
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This is an original proceeding in habeas corpus. The question which we are requested to determine is: “Where a prisoner has been paroled by the State Board of Pardons for a period of six months, and one of the conditions of the parole is that it was to be effective during good behavior, or until otherwise ordered by the Board, can said parole be revoked during the perod of six months by the State Board of Pardons ? And where it affirmatively appears from the writ of habeas corpus and return thereto that the six months period of parole has expired, can the Supreme Court, under said writ and return, release said prisoner, and if so, for how long?” The order of parole entered March 18th, 1936, was a follows:
“Therefore, Be It Known, That the said Louis Marenco be, and he is hereby paroled into the care and custody *272of Reverend C. W. Duke, Tampa, Florida, for a period of six months, who is required to report periodically to the Board as to his conduct, effective during good behavior or until otherwise ordered by the Board, at the expiration of said time he is to return to the Florida State Penitentiary, Raiford, Florida, and serve the remainder of his original sentence.”
It will be observed that by the express terms of the order the Board of Pardons limited the extent of the period of parole “until otherwise ordered by the Board.” Therefore, the Board of Pardons reserved the right to cancel the parole at any time. Whether or not the parole should be cancelled before the end of the period of six months was retained as a matter in the discretion of the Board. See State, ex rel. Brown, v. Mayo, 126 Fla. 811, 171 So. 822; Ex Parte Elvarez v. State, 50 Fla. 24, 39 Sou. 481.
So it is the contention of the petitioner is without merit and petitioner must be remanded to the custody of respondent.
So ordered.
Terrell, Brown and Chapman, J. J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Turner v. Louie L. Wainwright, 379 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)…40, it was “common knowledge” that, for many years before, “the Pardon Board of Florida has granted a type of release that has been loosely referred to as a ‘parole’ even by the Supreme Court of Florida.” 7 See, e. g., State ex rel. Morenco v. Mayo, 131 Fla. 271, 175 So. 806 (1937). Conceptually, pardons in the sense of paroles passed through the intermediate stage of “conditional pardons,” by which the convict was released with a “pardon” having its full and ancient effect upon his guilt, but not until he…
Authorities Cited
- Ex parte Alvarez v. State, 50 Fla. 24 (Fla. 1905)
- State v. Mayo, 126 Fla. 811 (Fla. 1937)