PRESTRESS ENGINEERING CORP.
v.
GONZALEZ ET AL.

U.S. | 1987-06-26
No. 86-1505
483 U.S. 1032 Supreme Court of the United States (1987) Positive Treatment
Cited by 16 cases
Dissent
Justice White,

Justice White,

dissenting.

This case raises the question whether a state-law claim for retaliatory discharge is pre-empted by § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.

S. C. § 185(a), when the suing employee is covered by a collective-bargaining agreement. The Illinois Supreme Court here, relying on its earlier opinion in Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 Ill. 2d 143, 473 N. E. 2d 1280, cert. denied, 472 U. S. 1032 (1984) and 474 U. S. 909 (1985), held that the state claim was not pre-empted. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, faced with an almost identical state-law claim for retaliatory discharge, concluded that under our opinion in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U. S. 202 (1985), § 301 pre-empted the state-law claim. Johnson v. Hussmann Corp., 805 F. 2d 795, 797 (1986) (Missouri).

One other Court of Appeals has come to a similar conclusion. See Vantine v. Elkhart Brass Manufacturing Co., 762 F. 2d 511, 517-518 (CA7 1985) (Indiana).

The Second Circuit, just three months ago, concluded that Connecticut’s retaliatory-discharge claim was not pre-empted by § 301. Baldracchi v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Div., United Technologies Corp., 814 F. 2d 102 (1987).

The Illinois Supreme Court has interpreted federal law in a manner consistent with the Second Circuit but directly contrary to the Seventh and Eighth Circuits. I would grant the petition and resolve the conflict, rather than wait until the conflict invites more litigation and becomes more acute.

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  • Palmas Y Bambu, S.A. v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 881 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)
    …mailing of false statements requesting payment of interest in excess of the agreed amount. The mailing of loan statements was an activity of the bank. There is no evidence of any other activity on the part of the alleged enterprise”), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1032, 107 S.Ct. 3276, 97 L.Ed.2d [*577] 780 (1987); Goldberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 1998 WL 321446, at *3 n. 5 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 1998)(observing that lawyers acting for a corporation are agents for RICO purposes); Moffatt Enters…
  • Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1989)
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  • Clark Davenport Snell v. Conley Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1990)
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