GUILD ET AL.

v.

BROCK, SECRETARY OF LABOR

Citator

Cited By

• Martin v. Consultants & Administrators, 966 F.2d 1078 (7th Cir. 1992)
  …he must have had specific knowledge of the actual breach of duty upon which he sues.’ ” Radiology Center, S.C. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 919 F. 2d 1216, 1221 (7th Cir.1990) (quoting Brock v. Nellis, 809 F. 2d 763, 755 (11th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1057, 108 S.Ct. 33, 97 L.Ed.2d 821 (1987)). At the same time, the relevant knowledge for triggering the statute of limitations is knowledge of the facts or transaction that constituted the alleged violation. Consequently, it is not necessary for a pot…
• The Radiology Ctr. v. Stifel, 919 F.2d 1216 (7th Cir. 1990)
  …overy of the fraud.”). Unlike the Illinois securities statute of limitations, however, the ERISA limitations provision, § 1113, speaks solely in terms of actual, not constructive, knowledge. See Brock v. Nellis, 809 F. 2d 753, 755, cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1057, 108 S.Ct. 33, 97 L.Ed.2d 821 (1987) (“To charge [plaintiff] with actual knowledge of an ERISA violation, it is not enough that he had notice that something was awry; he must have had specific knowledge of the actual breach of duty upon which he sue…
• Jackson v. Fort Stanton Hosp. & Training Sch., 964 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1992)
  …n fact was exercised” ’ ”); Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 807 F. 2d 1243, 1250 (5th Cir.) (“we may rule only on whether a decision to keep residents at SDC [Suffolk Developmental Center] is a rational decision based on professional judgment”), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1057, 108 S.Ct. 44, 97 L.Ed.2d 821 (1987). In the portion of the district court’s opinion that supports the injunctive relief issued, the court’s analysis clearly focuses on the second substantive due process obligation imposed on the state by Young-ber…