IN RE ESTATE OF ARTHUR PETER NORREGAARD, DECEASED. FRANCIS X. MACK AND MIAMI POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, APPELLANTS,
v.
V. ROBERT CARLISLE, AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF ARTHUR PETER NORREGAARD, DECEASED, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1969-03-18
No. 68-901
Before CHARLES CARROLL, C. J., and PEARSON and SWANN, JJ.
220 So. 2d 653 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1969) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

In this estate administration case, the court affirmed a trial judge's discretionary decision to extend the time for filing objections to creditor claims against a deceased's estate. The court held that the trial judge properly exercised discretion under Florida statute by finding good cause shown for the extension.


Holding

The trial judge did not abuse his discretion. The court affirmed the extension of time for filing objections because the record contained competent and substantial evidence that good cause had been shown, specifically that the personal representative had been lulled into a false sense of security concerning settlement of the claims.


Key Quotes

“The county judge for good cause shown may extend the time for filing objection to any claim or demand or the time for serving such objection”

Establishes the statutory authority under Fla.Stat. § 733.18(2) for trial judges to extend deadlines for filing objections to estate claims

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Facts & Procedural History

The appellants filed timely claims against the Estate of Arthur Peter Norregaard. After the statutory period for filing objections had expired, the ap…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The appellants filed timely claims against the Estate of Arthur Peter Norregaard in the trial court. They petitioned the court for payment after time had expired for filing objections to their claims. The ap-pellee then filed a sworn petition requesting permission to file objections to these claims. Permission was granted and the time was extended for filing objections to these claims. Objections to the claims were filed and later the- trial court denied the petition for payment of the claims. The appellants have appealed.

The essential question involved is whether the trial judge abused his discretion in deciding that good cause had been shown in granting the petition for extension of time in which to file objections to these claims.

Fla.Stat. § 733.18(2), F.S.A. provides in pertinent part:

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“The county judge for good cause shown may extend the time for filing objection to any claim or demand or the time for serving such objection * * *.”
* * * * * *

A similar situation was presented in Sessions v. Jelks, Fla.App.1967, 194 So.2d 307. There, as here, the statutory time for filing objections to the claim had expired. The court at Page 309 stated:

* * * * * *
“The statute under consideration limiting the time within which suit must be instituted on a claim to which objection has been made operates as rules of judicial procedure, the time limits of which may be relaxed by the county judge for *654good cause shown. The adjudication by the county judge in the exercise of his discretion is to be governed by a given standard of judicial action, viz.: ‘good cause shown/ subject to an appropriate judicial review, in order that right and justice shall be administered by due course of law as required by the constitution. The order extending the time for filing suit may be granted upon petition filed after lapse of the prescribed period.”

This record contains competent and substantial evidence, as in Sessions, supra, that the personal representative of this Estate had failed to take any action as a result of being lulled into a false sense of security concerning settlement of these claims and that “good cause” had been shown in this matter. We, therefore, find this case is governed by Sessions, supra, and affirm the actions of the trial judge herein appealed.

Affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By

  • In re Est. of Henrietta S. Sale, 227 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 1969)
    …actions of the personal representative of the estate, his agent or attorney, constitute “good cause” for an extension of time under the statute. See Sessions v. Jelks, Fla.App.lst 1967, 194 So. 2d 307;. In re Estate of Norregaard, Fla. App.3d 1969, 220 So. 2d 653; cf. In re Kamp’s Estate, Fla.App.lst 1965, 177 So. 2d 757. And in In re Meigs’ Estate, Fla. App.1st 1965, 177 So. 2d 246, it was held that informal discussions with the probate judge had the effect of lulling the personal representative into a fals…
  • Dade Cnty. v. Fla. Nat'l Bank at Coral Gables, 40 Fla. Supp. 76 (Dade Cty. Cir. Ct. 1974)
    …g suit. Accordingly, it has been held that the two month period prescribed by F.S. 733.18 operates as a rule of judicial procedure and not as a statute of non-claim. In re Estate of Sale, 227 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 1969); Estate of Norregaard v. Carlisle, 220 So. 2d 653 (Fla. App. 1969); Sessions v. Jelks, 194 So. 2d 307 (Fla. App. 1967). Moreover, the period for filing suit against an estate may be extended even after the time has run. In re Estate of Kemp, 177 So. 2d 757 (Fla. App. 1965). It would appear, therefo…
  • In re Est. of Theodore H. Wilisch v. Headley, 384 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
    …t the need for action, and he reasonably comes to that belief because of representations or actions of the personal representative of the estate or his agent. In re Estate of Herskowitz, 342 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); In re Estate of Norregaard, 220 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969); Sessions v. Jelks, 194 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967). There remains to be answered Seek’s contention that if, arguendo, Headley was lulled from February 20 (the date upon which he received Seek’s objection) to March 14 (the dat…

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