ELIZABETH DORRELL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, ET AL., APPELLEES
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Appellant sought uninsured motorist coverage under an insurance policy after being injured as a motorcycle passenger. The court held that under the policy's definition of "automobile," which excludes only specific vehicle types, a motorcycle qualifies as an automobile and therefore the appellant is entitled to uninsured motorist coverage.
A motorcycle is an "automobile" within the meaning of the insurance policy because the policy definition does not specifically exclude motorcycles, and applying the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius," the express exclusions of only certain vehicle types indicates that all other land vehicles, including motorcycles, are included in the definition.
“when we apply the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" to the above quoted portion of the insurance policy we conclude that as defined in the policy "automobile" means all land vehicles except those specifically excluded and that therefore a motorcycle is an automobile within the meaning of the instant insurance policy”
The court's primary holding establishing that the express exclusions in the policy definition imply inclusion of motorcycles.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceElizabeth Dorrell was injured when a motorcycle on which she was a passenger collided with an automobile driven by an uninsured motorist. The insuranc…
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The appellant was injured when a motorcycle on which she was a passenger collided with an automobile driven by an uninsured motorist. The appellee insurance company instituted an action for a declaration that the appellant was not protected by the insurance policy of the owner of the motorcycle. The court rendered judgment in favor of the appellee on the ground that a “motorcycle is not an ‘automobile’ as defined in the policy. * * *”
Counsel have agreed that under the terms of this policy the appellant would have received the benefit of uninsured motorist coverage if the vehicle on which she was riding had been an automobile.
Appellant claims coverage under the subject policy and urges that as the term “automobile” is defined in the pertinent provision of the policy a motorcycle is considered an automobile:
“ * * * ‘automobile’ means a land motor vehicle or trailer not operated on rails or crawler-treads, but does not mean: (1) a farm type tractor or other equipment designed for use primarily off public roads, except while actually upon public roads, or (2) a land motor vehicle or trailer while located for use as a residence or premises and not as a vehicle.”
In interpreting an automobile insurance policy the courts have followed the definitions given in the policy itself. See Valdes v. Prudence Mutual Casualty Company, Fla.App.1968, 207 So.2d 312, which cites Westerhausen v. Allied Mutual Insurance Company, 258 Iowa 969, 140 N.W.2d 719 (1966). The policy in the Westerhau-sen case provided “ ‘ “private passenger automobile” means a four wheel private passenger, station wagon or jeep type automobile.’” 140 N.W.2d at 722 (emphasis added).
The definition of “private passenger automobile” in the instant case is identical with that in the Westerhausen case except that it does not contain the words “four wheel”. And while the policy specifically provides that “automobile” does not mean (1) and (2), above, it does not specifically provide that “automobile” does not mean a motorcycle. So when we apply the maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alter-ius” to the above quoted portion of the insurance policy we conclude that as defined in the policy “automobile” means all land vehicles except those specifically excluded and that therefore a motorcycle is an automobile within the meaning of the instant *7insurance policy. We therefore reverse the finding of the trial judge that appellant is barred from uninsured motorist coverage because she was riding on a motorcycle.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
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Centennial Ins. Co. v. Wallace, 330 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)…h truck was uninsured and to grant summary judgment. This point has merit. In interpreting an automobile insurance policy the courts have followed the definitions given in the policy itself. Dorrell v. State Fire and Casualty Company, Fla.App.1969, 221 So. 2d 5 and cases cited therein. Appellant’s policy excludes from the definition of an uninsured vehicle “an automobile which is owned by a self-insurer within the meaning of any motor vehicle financial responsibility law . . . ,” and all parties concede th…
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Standard Marine Ins. Co. v. Allyn, 333 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)…). . Davis v. United Fidel. & G. Co. of Baltimore, Md., 172 So. 2d 485 (Fla.App. 1st 1965). See also Standard Accident Insurance Company v. Gavin, 184 So. 2d 229, 24 A.L.R.3d 1359, (Fla.App. 1st 1966). . Dorrell v. State Fire and Casualty Company, 221 So. 2d 5 (Fla.App. 3rd 1969). . Valdes v. Prudence Mutual Casualty Company, 207 So. 2d 312 (Fla.App. 3rd 1968).…
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Clough v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 636 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)…1992). The exclusion at issue does not mention motorcycles but rather refers to uninsured “autos.” No definition of “autos” as encompassing motorcycles or other two wheel vehicles appears in the policy. Compare Dorrell v. State Fire & Casualty Co., 221 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969) (defining automobile to mean “a land motor vehicle”). In Valdes v. Prudence Mut. Casualty Co., 207 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968), the Third District ruled that the word “automobile” in an “occupying an automobile other than an ins…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Frewer v. City OF Miami Beach, 207 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- Jullan Valdes v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 207 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)