J. I. WILSON, AS CHAIRMAN, AND EARL KEEFER, FRANK J. ANDERSON, GORDON H. MOYER, JR., CHARLES W. FOLGESONG, WILLIAM B. SMITH, AND HARRY D. FLEMMING, JR., AS MEMBERS OF THE PROFESSIONAL ETHICS COMMITTEE, SOUTH FLORIDA CHAPTER NO. 24, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, APPELLANTS,

v.

MARION C. MCCUNE, APPELLEE

BARKDULL, Judge.

This cause involves the propriety of a circuit judge exercising his chancery powers to enjoin disciplinary proceedings in a voluntary association. The appellants are members of the Professional Ethics Committee, South Florida Chapter No. 24, American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers. This is a national voluntary association, and the appellee is a member of this association. The association’s regulations contain certain provisions for conducting hearings to discipline members for alleged violations of its rules, regulations or code of ethics. The regulations also provide that a party disciplined shall have the right to appeal any such finding to the National Association and, even if the party disciplined does not take an appeal, there is automatic review.1

Informal charges, in accordance with the regulations, were brought against the ap-pellee by the appellants [constituting the appropriate Committee of the local Chapter of the Institute], These were followed by a 20-day notice of formal proceedings. *232Thereafter, the appellee sought more specific charges of which he was duly advised.2 On the date originally set for hearing, he filed his complaint seeking to enjoin the proceedings, which was met by an answer. The facts not being in dispute, the trial court, upon final hearing, granted the appellee’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and a permanent injunction enjoining the appellants from proceeding further with disciplinary proceedings against the appellee.

The trial court’s voluminous order found that the charges were vague and indefinite; that the proceedings were not being conducted in accordance with the regulations of the Institute and, further, that a particular regulation of the parent Institute was invalid.3 The appellants urge, primarily, that the trial court should not have interfered with the internal disciplinary actions of a voluntary association, citing the following authorities; Grand Lodge, Knights of Pythias of Florida v. Taylor, 79 Fla. 441, 84 So. 609; Harper v. Hoecherl, 153 Fla. 29, 14 So.2d 179; La Gorce Country Club v. Cerami, Fla.1954, 74 So.2d 95; Smith v. Merriott, 130 Md. 447, 100 A. 731. The appellee responds that a chancery court is authorized to interfere in disciplinary proceedings, citing the following authorities: La Gorce Country Club v. Cerami, supra; Needelman v. Dade County Medical Association, Fla.App.1967, 205 So.2d 17; Swital v. Real Estate Com’r, 116 Cal.App.2d 677, 254 P.2d 587; O’Brien v. Matual, 14 Ill.App.2d 173, 144 N.E.2d 446.

We are in accord with the law cited by the appellee to sustain the ruling of the trial judge. And, if the association or organization involved in the instant proceeding were one of a quasi-judicial or administrative agency of the State, we would not hesitate to affirm the action of the trial judge. Or, if the actions being taken by an association or agency should result in the disciplined member being prevented from engaging in his chosen profession or occupation in this State, we would not hesitate to affirm the action of the trial judge. However, this cause does not involve such an association or agency. The Institute involved in the instant proceeding is a mere voluntary organization, and the appellee will not be prohibited from practicing his chosen occupation or profession by virtue of any disciplinary action that might ultimately be taken by the Institute. We therefore hold that it was error for the trial judge to interfere with disciplinary action being taken by a voluntary association against a member, until such time as the member had exhausted the avenues of appeal provided for him within the regulations of the Institute. This view comports with the general authorities on this subject, as found in: Grand Lodge, Knights of Pythias of Florida v. Taylor, supra, 79 Fla. at page 456; 84 So. at page 613:

* * * * * *

“The rule is generally recognized that, where one is expelled from a beneficial association, he must exhaust his remedy in the association before he can appeal to the courts either for reinstatment or damages for expulsion.”

******

*2333 Fla.Jur., Associations and Clubs, § 7, at page 188:

* * * * *

“A member of a voluntary association or society who is wrongfully expelled has a remedy in the courts only if some property or contractual rights acquired by reason of his membership are affected, and even in such cases he must first exhaust his remedies within the organization. * * * ”

******

7 C.J.S. Associations § 25, at page 65:

******

“Where an association under its rules suspends or expels a member, such member must ordinarily resort to and exhaust the remedies provided by .the association under its constitution and bylaws before applying to the courts for relief. * * * "

******

Also see: Harper v. Hoecherl, supra.

As indicated by the footnotes in the earlier portion of this opinion, it is apparent that the Institute provided a form of notice, a reasonable opportunity to be heard, and an adequate review prior to the ultimate effect of any disciplinary action. With such being available to the appellee,4 the judicial machinery of the State should not have been activated until such time as the appellee had exhausted his rights available under the Institute which he had voluntarily joined.

In view of what has been said above, this cause will be remanded to the trial judge, with directions to dismiss the complaint without prejudice to the appellee to raise any alleged deficiencies in the rules, regulations or by-laws of the Institute in any appropriate judicial proceedings, subsequent to the exhaustion of the procedures for review available within the Institute in the event he should be disciplined by the appellants.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

CHARLES CARROLL, Chief Judge

(dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. I feel the trial judge was correct in holding that the appellants were attempting to proceed against the appellee on charges which were insufficient for the purpose, under appellants’ regulatory requirements as to such. A proceeding by a professional association against a member is of graver consequence than one by a private club to admonish or expel a member. The latter concerns only social convenience and status, whereas the former involves professional reputation and affects livelihood. The charges in this instance were defective and insufficient for failure to contain a statement of particulars as expressly required, and in my opinion it was proper in that situation to resort to equity to restrain the proceeding which was so predicated.