ANDRE LEE SHELLMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Andre Lee Shellman appeals his conviction for breaking and entering an automobile with intent to commit petit larceny, challenging only his sentence of ten years imprisonment as the statutory maximum. The appellate court affirms, holding that a sentence within statutory limits cannot be deemed cruel and unusual punishment regardless of its severity.
A sentence that falls within the statutory limits fixed by law is not cruel and unusual punishment and is therefore valid regardless of how severe it may appear in a particular case. The constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment applies to the statute fixing the punishment, not to the particular punishment assessed by a court within those statutory limits.
“jn cases where the objection is to the particular sentence, and not to the statute under which it has been imposed, a sentence which is within the limit fixed by statute is not cruel and unusual and is therefore valid, no matter how harsh and severe it may appear to be in a particular case”
Establishes the core holding that sentences within statutory limits cannot be challenged as cruel and unusual regardless of severity
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceShellman pleaded guilty to breaking and entering an automobile with intent to commit petit larceny. The trial court sentenced him to ten years impriso…
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This is an appeal by appellant Andre Lee Shellman from an adjudication of guilt and sentence by the Court upon a plea of guilty to an information charging breaking and entering an automobile with intent to commit petit larceny.
The only contention urged in behalf of Shellman in this Court is that the trial Judge was in error in sentencing the defendant to the statutory maximum sentence of ten years in the State Prison. But the rule was definitely laid down by the Florida Supreme Court in Brown v. State, 1943, 152 Fla. 853, 13 So.2d 458, that—
“* * * jn cases where the objection is to the particular sentence, and not to the statute under which it has been imposed, a sentence which is within the limit fixed by statute is not cruel and unusual and is therefore valid, no matter how harsh and severe it may appear to be in a particular case, because the constitutional prohibition has reference to the statute fixing the punishment, and not to the punishment assessed by the jury or court within the limits fixed by statute. If the statute is not in violation of the Constitution, then any punishment assessed by a court or jury within the limits fixed thereby cannot be adjudged excessive, for the reason that the power to declare what punishment may be assessed against those convicted of crime is not a judicial power, but a legislative power, controlled only by the provisions of the Constitution.”
The above holding in Brown was followed in Walker v. State, Fla.1950, 44 So.2d 814. See also Rohdin v. State, Fla.App.1958, 105 So.2d 371; Infante v. State, Fla.App.1967, 197 So.2d 542; and Dickin*790son v. State, Fla.App.1965, 170 So.2d 594. See also Green v. State, 1935, 121 Fla. 307, 163 So. 712.
F.S. Section 810.051, F.S.A. provides that “Whoever breaks and enters any automobile * * * with intent to commit any crime * * * shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by * * * imprisonment * * * for not more than ten years in the state prison * * ”. Concededly, this may be a harsh maximum punishment, considering that the breaking and entering the dwelling of another with intent to commit a misdemeanor is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding five years, F.S. § 810.05 F.S.A. But the fixing of minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment for criminal convictions is exclusively the province of the legislature, and the imposition of punishment within such limitations is a matter for the trial Court in the exercise of its discretion, which cannot be inquired into upon the appellate level.
The judgment appealed from is therefore affirmed.
LILES, C. J., concurs.
MANN, J., concurs in the judgment.
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Nusspickel v. State, 966 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…ial court’s imposition of a sentence that is within the minimum and maximum limits set by the legislature “is a matter for the trial Court in the exercise of its discretion, which cannot be inquired into upon the appellate level.” Shellman v. State, 222 So. 2d 789, 790 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969); see also Booker v. State, 514 So. 2d 1079, 1082 (Fla.1987) (recognizing that “this Court and the United States Supreme Court have embraced the notion that so long as the sentence imposed is within the maximum limit set by th…
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O'Donnell v. State, 326 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1975)…rown, supra, upheld consecutive life sentences imposed for second degree murder convictions. With respect to this point, see also Walker v. State, 44 So. 2d 814 (Fla.1950); Alspaugh v. State, 133 So. 2d 587 (2d DCA Fla.1961); and Shellman v. State, 222 So. 2d 789 (2d DCA Fla.1969). We believe that the foregoing cases also are dispositive of the contention that the sentence violated appellant’s right to due process of law as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Florida in t…
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Peters v. State, 128 So. 3d 832 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)…um limits set by the legislature ‘is a matter for the trial [c]ourt in the exercise of its discretion, which cannot be inquired into upon the appellate level.’ ” Nusspickel v. State, 966 So. 2d 441, 444 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (quoting Shellman v. State, 222 So. 2d 789, 790 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)). However, an exception exists where “a court ... considers] charges of which an accused has been acquitted in passing sentence.” Epprecht v. State, 488 So. 2d 129, 131 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (citing Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 7…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Brown v. State, 152 Fla. 853 (Fla. 1943)
- Infante v. State, 197 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)
- Green v. State, 121 Fla. 307 (Fla. 1935)
- Walker v. State, 44 So.2d 814 (Fla. 1950)
- Dickinson v. State, 170 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965)
- Milgrim v. Kinser, 105 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958)