GRANGE INSURANCE ASSN.

v.

WASHINGTON ET AL.

Citator

Cited By (20 total)

• Heineken v. Heineken, 683 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
  …to personal jurisdiction, on grounds that a motion for attorney’s fees is “purely defensive action” and does not seek “affirmative relief,” citing Grange Insurance Association v. State, 110 Wash.2d 752, 757 P. 2d 933 (1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004, 109 S.Ct. 1638, 104 L.Ed.2d 154 (1989). But the weight of authority supports the view that an award of attorney’s fees does constitute affirmative relief. Courts outside Washington State that have considered the question have concluded not only th…
• United States v. David A. Sturman (90-3147), 951 F.2d 1466 (6th Cir. 1991)
  …e matter to which that party objects and the grounds of the objection. This rule clearly indicates that a specific objection must be made with regard to charge requests. See United States v. Friedman, 854 F. 2d 535, 555 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004, 109 S.Ct. 1637, 104 L.Ed.2d 153 (1989); United States v. Martinez, 776 F. 2d 1481, 1484 (10th Cir.1985) (holding that the objection “both instructions fit this case and should be given” is inadequate to preserve issue). The defendants in this case…
• United States v. Lopez, 937 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1991)
  …ty objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which that party objects and the grounds of the objection.”). See also United States v. Friedman, 854 F. 2d 535, 554-56 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004, 109 S.Ct. 1637, 104 L.Ed.2d 153 (1989). Since the absence of such a charge was not plain error, we may not address it. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). E. Sentencing. All three defendants raise sentencing issues. Lopez claims that the district judge fail…