THE STATE OF FLORIDA EX REL. ULYSSES BIRD, RELATOR,
v.
THE HONORABLE CARLING STEDMAN, AS JUDGE OF THE CRIMINAL COURT OF RECORD FOR DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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The Florida District Court of Appeal held that a defendant who files three successive demands for speedy trial under Florida statute § 915.01(2) and is not tried within the third term is forever discharged from the crime itself, not merely from the specific information. The state cannot circumvent this protection by dismissing the original prosecution and refiling the same charge under a new information.
The statute's protection applies to the crime charged, not merely to the specific information, and its operation is mandatory rather than discretionary. Once properly invoked through three successive demands for speedy trial without a trial within three terms, the defendant is forever discharged from the crime and the state cannot refile the charge under a new information.
“The failure of the state to proceed to trial before the expiration of the third term, coupled with the relator's filing of the requisite number of demands for speedy trial, forever discharged relator from the crime with which he was charged. This is true because the statute refers to 'crime' — not 'information'- — -and because the operation of the statute once properly invoked is mandatory — not discretionary.”
Establishes the core holding that discharge applies to the crime itself, not the information, and is mandatory.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRelator Bird filed three successive demands for speedy trial pursuant to § 915.01(2), Fla.Stat., in three successive court terms and was not brought t…
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This suggestion for writ of prohibition is based upon an allegation that relator may not be tried because he filed three successive demands for speedy trial in three successive terms of court pursuant to § 915.01(2), Fla.Stat., F.S.A., and was not tried within the third term. Prior to the expiration of the third term a nolle prosequi was entered upon the prior information, and another information was filed. Upon the expiration of the third term this suggestion was filed. Respondent asserts that the demands referred to by the relator were directed to prior informations and not the information upon which relator is now being prosecuted.
The suggestion, the reply of the respondent, and the briefs make clear that the sole question presented is whether the *86state may avoid the effect of § 915.01 (2),1 Fla.Stat., by dismissing the prosecution of respondent and then subsequently refiling the same charge under a new information.
The failure of the state to proceed to trial before the expiration of the third term, coupled with the relator’s filing of the requisite number of demands for speedy trial, forever discharged relator from the crime with which he was charged. This is true because the statute refers to “crime” — not “information”- — -and because the operation of the statute once properly invoked is mandatory — not discretionary.
It is clear in the instant case that the nolle prosequi was entered by the prosecution solely for the purpose of avoiding the effect of the statute. The reply to the suggestion contains the statement: “The respondent admits the accuracy of all factual allegations contained in the suggestion for the writ of prohibition and the exhibits thereto.” No other reason for the discontinuance of the first prosecution is given.
A general rule of construction is that remedial statutes are to be construed liberally in order to give them the beneficial effect intended. Becker v. Amos, 105 Fla. 231, 141 So. 136, 80 A.L.R. 1480 (1932); Howard v. American Service Mutual Insurance Co., Fla.App.1963, 151 So.2d 682, 8 A.L.R.3d 382. In this instance the beneficial effect is to enforce the constitutional right of a speedy trial in criminal cases. A holding that the statute applies to the information filed and not the crime for which the accused is prosecuted would make possible the indefinite postponement of prosecution for a crime by the simple expedient of a continuous entry of nolle prosequis and a continuous refiling of in-formations charging the same crime. This would violate the right of one accused of a crime to a speedy trial, which right is guaranteed by the Declaration of Rights, § 16, Florida Constitution, F.S.A., and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Cf. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967).
In view of our holding we anticipate that the trial court will discharge the relator and that no further action will be taken except upon further petition.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Carroll v. State, 251 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 1971)…sult. This conclusion is consistent with previous pronouncements of our Court to the effect that the speedy trial statute applies to the “crime” charged and not to any specific indictment or information filed thereon. State ex rel. Bird v. Stedman, 223 So. 2d 85 (Fla.App.3rd, 1969); Gossett v. Hanlon, 195 So. 2d 865 (Fla.App.4th, 1967). Petitioner’s right to a speedy trial under the cited statute has been violated and he is entitled to be discharged. [*872] The order of the District Court of Appeal is quas…
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State v. Dorian, 619 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…later, state files information charging resisting arrest without violence; defendant files motion for discharge; held trial court correctly granted motion as to [*317] misdemeanor of resisting arrest without violence); State ex rel. Bird v. Stedman, 223 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969) (state nolle prosses information just before expiration of speedy trial limit and refiles the same information after speedy trial limit expires; defendant files motion for discharge under speedy trial statute, Section 915.01(2), F…
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Robertson v. State, 245 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)…s for a speedy trial. The provisions of the statute may be invoked upon arrest and do not require the filing of an indictment or information. State ex rel. Buono v. Goodman, Fla.App.1970, 233 So. 2d 185; State ex rel. Bird v. Stedman, Fla.App. 1969, 223 So. 2d 85; State ex rel. Wincor v. Turner, Fla.App. 1969, 222 So. 2d 763; and § 915.01(2), Fla.Stat. Robertson next asserts that the trial court erred “in its conduct and supervision of the testimony of the state’s witness Charles Celona.” He contends this b…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (U.S. 1967)
- Howard v. Am. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 151 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963)
- Becker v. Amos, 105 Fla. 231 (Fla. 1932)