STATE OF FLORIDA EX REL. CHARLES L. BALDWIN, PETITIONER,
v.
CAPTAIN ALSBURY, OFFICER IN CHARGE OF THE DADE COUNTY STOCKADE, AND ROCKY POMERANTZ, CHIEF OF POLICE OF MIAMI BEACH, FLORIDA, RESPONDENTS
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In this habeas corpus case, the Florida Supreme Court held that a municipal court lacked power to indefinitely suspend a sentence in exchange for a defendant's promise to leave town, and that reinstatement of the original sentence after the statutory maximum period had expired violated the defendant's constitutional rights.
The court held that the municipal court lacked power to impose an indefinitely suspended sentence conditioned on banishment, and that the City could not reinstate the 1964 sentence because the maximum imprisonment authorized by the City Charter had long since expired. Petitioner was entitled to release from all restraints resulting from the 1964 conviction.
“the court was without power to indefinitely suspend a sentence in return for petitioner's promise, to stay out of town.”
Establishes the core holding that municipal courts lack statutory authority to impose indefinitely suspended sentences conditioned on banishment.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePetitioner Baldwin was convicted of shoplifting in Miami Beach Municipal Court in March 1964 and sentenced to 60 days imprisonment. After serving 18 d…
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Petitioner in this habeas corpus proceeding was arrested and tried in March 1964 in the Municipal Court of the City of Miami Beach for shoplifting. He was found guilty and sentenced to sixty (60) days’ imprisonment. After serving eighteen (18) days of the sentence, petitioner “wrote to the judge who gave him an option of a suspended sentence and an O.T., i. e. out-of-town, or informal banishment.” On March 31, 1969, petitioner was arrested in Miami Beach and charged with shoplifting but was found not guilty. The old charge was found in petitioner’s court file and was reinstated; There were forty-two (42) days remaining to be served. Petitioner served two (2) of these days in the Miami Beach jail and is to serve the remaining forty (40) days in the Dade County Stockade.
Petitioner contends that his incarceration is illegal because: (1) It amounts to a restraint on petitioner’s freedom of movement in violation of the commerce clause, the privileges and immunities and the due process clauses of the Federal Constitution and corresponding provisions of the Florida Constitution. (2) Banishment of petitioner from the city is cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Federal and Florida Constitutions. (3) A municipal court in Florida has sentencing power which is strictly limited to maximum sentences of sixty (60) days so the indefinitely extended suspended sentence is invalid.
We issued the writ. Petitioner is not presently incarcerated. He was released from custody on his own recognizance by the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida. That order, dated April 8, 1969, provides his release shall continue pending disposition df the writ of habeas corpus issued by this court.
Respondents in their return admit the facts stated in the petition but contend that since petitioner, of his own volition, asked court to turn him loose in return for his promise to stay out of town, he cannot now complain, when, on returning to the jurisdiction, he is made to complete the service of his sentence.
There is no merit to this. argument in view of the fact that the court was without power to indefinitely suspend a sentence in return for petitioner’s promise, to stay out of town. The maximum imprisonment authorized by the City Charter of the City of Miami Beach has long since expired1 and the respondents have failed to suggest any valid basis for petitioner’s confinement.
In view of the foregoing, the City may not now reinstate the 1964 sentence and petitioner is entitled to be released from all further restraints resulting therefrom.
It is so ordered.
ERVIN, C. J., and DREW, CARLTON and ADKINS, JJ., concur.