MILDRED O. THOMPSON, PETITIONER,
v.
FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION DIVISION, MORRIS RESTAURANT, AND LONDON AND LANCASHIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, RESPONDENTS

Fla. | 1969-06-18
No. 38288
DREW and CARLTON, JJ., and CUL-VER SMITH, Circuit Judge, concur.
224 So. 2d 286 Florida Supreme Court (1969) Caution
Cited by 4 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.


Holding

The court held that the carrier was justified in ceasing temporary total disability payments after 350 weeks, as per the statute.


Facts & Procedural History

Petitioner was injured in a compensable accident and received temporary total disability benefits for 350 weeks. The respondent carrier stopped paymen…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
ADKINS, Justice.

ADKINS, Justice.

This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari seeking to review an order of the Florida Industrial Commission affirming an order of the Judge of Industrial Claims denying further compensation, other than medical benefits, to the petitioner.

Petitioner was injured in ,a compensable accident and was paid temporary total disability benefits for a period of 350 weeks. Respondent carrier stopped payments but has continued to furnish medical treatment to petitioner.

Petitioner has not reached maximum medical improvement and is still totally disabled. However, the physicians still refer to his disability as “temporary.”

Fla.Stat., § 440.15(2), F.S.A., specifies compensation for temporary total disability in the following language:

“In case of disability total in character but temporary in quality, sixty per cent of the average weekly wages shall be paid to the employee during the continuance thereof, not to exceed three hundred and fifty weeks.”

This statute is clear and unambiguous in its language. The carrier was justified in ceasing to pay additional temporary total disability benefits.

The Florida Workmen’s Compensation Act is inadequate in failing to provide for a situation such as this. However, the remedy lies with the Legislature and not with the Florida Industrial Commission or the Court.

The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

DREW and CARLTON, JJ., and CUL-VER SMITH, Circuit Judge, concur.

ERVIN, C. J., concurs specially with opinion.

ERVIN, Chief Justice

(concurring specially) :

I concur in the judgment denying the petition for writ of certiorari, but without prejudice to any future determination at a proper hearing concerning whether the claimant is permanently totally disabled due to the industrial accident of March 22, 1961, and, if so, the date when the claimant became permanently totally disabled, which could be found to be retroactive to the time the claimant was no longer temporarily totally disabled. If such be found, claimant would be entitled to permanent total disability benefits pursuant to F.S. Section 440.15(1), F.S.A., from the date of her permanent total disability.

It is noted the Judge of Industrial Claims recites in his order:

“The undersigned further feels compelled to note that it would probably be to the best interests of the carrier to continue to pay to the claimant benefits of an undesignated character as eventually payments of benefits for this period of time will have to be made although, as set forth in the statute, the carrier is justified in ceasing to pay additional temporary total disability benefits * *
Concurrence
ERVIN, Chief Justice

ERVIN, Chief Justice

(concurring specially) :

I concur in the judgment denying the petition for writ of certiorari, but without prejudice to any future determination at a proper hearing concerning whether the claimant is permanently totally disabled due to the industrial accident of March 22, 1961, and, if so, the date when the claimant became permanently totally disabled, which could be found to be retroactive to the time the claimant was no longer temporarily totally disabled. If such be found, claimant would be entitled to permanent total disability benefits pursuant to F.S. Section 440.15(1), F.S.A., from the date of her permanent total disability.

It is noted the Judge of Industrial Claims recites in his order:

“The undersigned further feels compelled to note that it would probably be to the best interests of the carrier to continue to pay to the claimant benefits of an undesignated character as eventually payments of benefits for this period of time will have to be made although, as set forth in the statute, the carrier is justified in ceasing to pay additional temporary total disability benefits * *

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Matrix Emp. Leasing, Inc. v. Hadley, 78 So. 3d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)
    …due respect for my colleagues, I do not believe we are required to reach such an unjust result in order to protect the integrity of the time limit on eligibility for temporary benefits. The majority cites Thompson v. Florida Industrial Commission, 224 So. 2d 286 (Fla.1969) in support of its holding, but that decision does not compel adherence to Oswald. The 1961 statute the court was interpreting in Thompson had a limit of 350 weeks on temporary total disability benefits and it had no provision for statutor…
    1 / 3
  • Elva Chavarria v. Selugal Clothing, Inc., 840 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)
    …appellant argues on appeal that under certain case law, the JCC failed to provide adequate reasons for acceptance of the Rogachefsky and Espinosa opinions. II. Workers’ compensation law in Florida is statutory. See Thompson v. Fla. Indus. Comm’n, 224 So. 2d 286, 287 (Fla.1969) (noting that the remedy for any inadequacy in the Workmen’s Compensation Act lies with the Legislature and not with the Industrial Commission or the court); Fournigault v. Jackson Mem’l Hosp. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 87 So. 2d 102…

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw