CALVIN HOLDEN AND LOUISE HOLDEN, HUSBAND AND WIFE, APPELLANTS,
v.
M. D. DYE, D/B/A MAC'S AUTO MART AND WILLIE CLYDE GREEN, APPELLEES
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In this negligence action arising from an automobile collision, the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion for a new trial after a jury verdict against her. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the jury question regarding comparative negligence was properly left to the jury and the trial judge did not abuse discretion in denying the new trial motion.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial because the evidence presented a jury question regarding comparative negligence. Although a presumption of negligence arises when a plaintiff's vehicle is hit from the rear, defendant's testimony that plaintiff pulled into traffic in front of an approaching vehicle was sufficient to dissipate that presumption and present a jury question.
“Where a plaintiff's automobile is hit from the rear by the defendant, a presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant arises.”
Establishes the foundational legal presumption in rear-end collision cases
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant Holden pulled away from the curb on Pace Boulevard, angled across two traffic lanes, and stopped in the inside lane at a corner to await pas…
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This is a negligence case arising out of an automobile collision. Appellants, plaintiffs below, having suffered an adverse jury verdict, moved for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. The motion was denied and plaintiffs now seek reversal of the order denying a new trial.
The facts underlying this action are brief. Appellant had been parked in the middle of the block on Pace Boulevard one-hundred-fifty feet south of Blount Street in Pensacola. At this point, Pace was a four-lane artery, two going in each direction. Appellant drove off from the curb, angled across the two traffic lanes and when she arrived at the corner, she stopped in the inside lane to await passage of oncoming traffic preparatory to making a left turn. As noted, she did all this as she proceeded forward a distance of one-hundred-fifty feet. The defendant, traveling in the same direction at a speed within the posted limit, attempted to go around her inside when he saw her cutting across into his lane and not being able to do so because of the traffic at his rear, he applied his brakes but it was too late. He left twenty-one feet of skid marks before his car collided with appellant’s car.
The plaintiff driver said she put her turn blinkers on when she pulled away from the curb and again when she had reached the turning lane. The defendant’s testimony was that plaintiff pulled out from the curb and came across his path to her stopping place at the corner when he was only a short distance behind her and that he overtook her upon being unable to either get around her or stop before the collision occurred.
Thus, the evidence was such that a jury question was presented. Where a plaintiff’s automobile is hit from the rear by the defendant, a presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant arises. McNulty v. Cusack, 104 So.2d 785 (Fla.App.1958). However, where the defendant goes forward with the evidence and introduces matters which if believed by the jury tend to dissipate the presumption of negligence on his part, then the question of defendant’s negligence is one for the jury to determine. Gulle v. Boggs, 174 So.2d 26 (Fla.1965). In the instant case, such a jury question was created by defendant’s testimony which if believed tended to show that he had not failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances and that, on the contrary, the plaintiff’s action of pulling out into lanes of traffic being traveled by a nearby approaching vehicle was the causal factor leading to the accident.
In these circumstances, we cannot hold that the trial judge erred in denying appellants’ motion for new trial. To justify such a holding, it must first be shown that the evidence contained in the record on appeal establishes an abuse of discretion by the trial judge in denying appellants’ motion for new trial. Cosby-Hodges Milling Co. v. Sheffield, 183 So.2d 749 (Fla.App.1966); and Pix Shoes of Miami, Inc. v. Howarth, 201 So.2d 80 (Fla.App.1967).
Affirmed.
JOHNSON, C. J., and RAWLS and SPECTOR, JJ., concur.
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Eppler v. Tarmac Am., Inc., 752 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 2000)…her road emergency that prevented him from braking in time to avoid the collision when the forward driver unexpectedly decelerated was sufficient to create a jury question on whether the rear driver was acting reasonably. Likewise, in Holden v. Dye, 224 So. 2d 350, 351 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969), the presumption of negligence was found to be rebutted when the defendant testified that the plaintiff pulled out sharply from a parking spot in front of the defendant, and that the defendant could not avoid hitting the pla…
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Gertrude Tozier v. Jarvis, 469 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)…of the defendant with only a 10 or 12-foot gap separating the vehicles. This positive testimony was enough to allow the jury verdict to be reinstated after the trial judge improperly entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In Holden v. Dye, 224 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969), the presumption was held to be rebutted when the defendant testified that the plaintiff pulled out sharply from a parking spot in front of the defendant, and [*887] that the defendant could not avoid hitting the plaintiff despit…
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Darr v. Aglin, 279 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)…155 So. 2d 809 (1 Fla.App.1963). . Pensacola Transit Co. v. Denton, 119 So. 2d 296 (1 Fla.App.1960) ; Stark v. Vasquez, 168 So. 2d 140 (Fla.1964) ; Al- [*64] terman Transport Lines, Inc. v. McCahon, 168 So. 2d 707 (3 Fla.App.1964) ; Holden v. Dye, 224 So. 2d 350 (1 Fla.App.1969) ; Ben’s Seltzer, Inc. v. Markey, 254 So. 2d 377 (3 Fla.App.1971) ; and Knabb v. Tompkins, 254 So. 2d 858 (1 Fla.App.1971). . Frazier v. Ross, 225 So. 2d 451 (1 Fla.App.1969). . F.S. § 316.276, F.S.A.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gulle v. Purley L. Boggs, 174 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1965)
- McNULTY v. Cusack, 104 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)
- PIX Shoes OF Miami, Inc. v. Howarth, 201 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)
- Higgins v. State, 183 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966)