DOROTHY EVANS, A WIDOW,
v.
CARL GREEN, JULIA GREEN AND PATRICIAN HOTEL COMPANY
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Dorothy Evans, a widow and creditor, appealed from orders appointing and confirming a receiver for Patrician Hotel Company, challenging the administration of the receivership on the ground that it was being operated in the interests of the receiver's personnel rather than the trust beneficiaries. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the receivership orders but directed the trial court to amend them to ensure economical administration and preservation of trust property.
While the general rule prohibits a litigant from appealing a decree in his favor, the Court held that changed conditions and the interests of justice may require modification of this rule. The Court affirmed the receivership orders but directed the trial court to amend them to preserve trust property and ensure its economical administration for the benefit of the beneficiaries rather than the receiver's representatives.
“The rule is generally recognized that a litigant cannot appeal from a decree in his favor.”
Establishes the general rule against appealing favorable decrees, but the Court notes it may be modified when justice requires.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDorothy Evans, as complainant, applied for and secured the appointment of a receiver for Patrician Hotel Company on March 25, 1938. A second order con…
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Pursuant to application of Appellant, as complainant, an order was entered March 25, 1938, appointing a receiver for Appellee, Patrician Hotel Company. On March 31, 1938, a second order was entered in the cause confirming the appointment of said receiver. We are confronted here with separate appeals from both orders, a motion to consolidate them having been entered and hereby granted.
The appeals are taken by the complainant who applied for and secured the appointment of the receiver. The records have been lodged in this Court, briefs have been filed, and the merits of the cause argued on application for a supersedeas, so the whole matter is before us for final adjudication.
The rule is generally recognized that a litigant cannot appeal from a decree in his favor. Witt and Witt v. Baars, Trading as Baars & Co., 36 Fla. 119, 18 So. 330, but it would be going far to hold that under our .system of jurisprudence, conditions would never arise in which rules of general application should not be modified when the justice of the cause resulting from changed conditions requires.
It is contended here that the property in receivership is being administered in the interest of the receiver’s representative, auditors, attorneys, and a retinue of other em*471ployees, rather than in the interest of those claiming the estate being administered. It is not charged that the Court’s receiver is not fair and impartial and in all other respects qualified.
A receivership is not operated in the interest of those appointed for that purpose. They are merely incidents; it is conducted for the benefit of those who own the trust property and they are the ones entitled to the proceeds of it. Trust property may be more easily dissipated by unwise administration than through the practice of the technique of the bandit but regardless of the manner in which done, the result is little different to the cestui que trust.
The decrees appealed from are accordingly affirmed, but with leave of the Chancellor to amend so as to preserve the trust property and insure its economical administration.
It is so ordered.
Ellis, C. J., and Terrell and Buford, J. J., concur.
Whitfield, P. J., and Chapman, J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
Brown, J., concurs in the conclusion.
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Citator
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Emp'rs Fire Ins. Co. v. Blanchard, 234 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970)…not appeal from, or file any proceedings to review, an order or judgment in his favor. Paul v. Kanter, Fla.App. 1963, 155 So. 2d 402; In re Rose’s Estate, Fla.App.1964, 165 So. 2d 226; Akins v. Bethea, Fla. 1948, 33 So. 2d 638; Evans v. Green, 1938, 132 Fla. 469, 180 So. 753; [*383] Lovett v. Lovett, 1927, 93 Fla. 611, 112 So. 768; State Road Department of Florida v. Zetrouer, 1932, 105 Fla. 650, 142 So. 217; North Shore Bank v. Town of Surfside, Fla.1954, 72 So. 2d 659. The recital in the order granting t…
Authorities Cited
- Witt v. Baars, 36 Fla. 119 (Fla. 1895)