MAYFLOWER INVESTMENT COMPANY
v.
A. BRILL, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME OF BRILL ELECTRIC COMPANY; CONTINENTAL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, A FLORIDA CORPORATION; LONDON OPERATING COMPANY, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, AND MCDONALD ELECTRIC CO., INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION
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The Florida Supreme Court granted a rehearing after initially denying it, finding that an intervenor-appellant had been deprived of notice and opportunity to be heard when the lower court dismissed the cause without notifying the intervenor, despite the intervenor's vital interest in the subject matter.
The Court granted rehearing, concluding that the dismissal order was void or at least voidable as to the intervenor-appellant because the intervenor had a vested interest in the subject matter acquired through proper intervention, and this interest could not be divested by dismissal without notice to the intervenor.
“the intervenor had a vital interest in the cause, and was entitled to notice”
Establishes the fundamental principle that an intervenor with a vital interest in the subject matter is entitled to notice before dismissal
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMayflower Investment Company intervened in litigation below after obtaining due notice to all parties and filing a bill of intervention establishing i…
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In a previous order of this Court petition for rehearing was denied, but the Court has, upon further consideration of said petition, reached the conclusion that a rehearing should be granted. It appears that the cause below was dismissed by the court without notice to the intervenor, appellant here, and that the intervenor had a vital interest in the cause, and was entitled to notice. It is true that Section 70 of the 1931 Chancery Act provides that petition for rehearing shall be filed within twenty days, whereas this petition to vacate the order dismissing the *531cause was not filed until several months had elapsed. However, the petition to vacate alleged that the defendant had no notice and was without knowledge of the decree of dismissal until shortly before the petition to vacate was filed. It is contended by the appellant that inasmuch as it had been allowed to intervene in the cause below, after due notice to all parties, and had been allowed to file its bill of intervention, setting up its interest in the subject matter of the suit, that it had acquired a vested interest in such subject matter of the suit of which it could not be deprived, by order of dismissal, granted on the motion of the complainant, without notice to or knowledge of, the appellantintervenor, and that therefore the said order of the court dismissing the cause was void, or at least voidable, as to appellant.
In view of these circumstances, and in view of the importance of the question presented the Court has decided to vacate its order denying rehearing, and does hereby grant a rehearing in this cause, upon briefs and without oral argument. Appellant is granted twenty days in which to file its brief on this rehearing and appellees are granted fifteen days thereafter in which to file a reply brief.
It is so ordered.
Whitfield, P. J., and Brown and Chapman, J. J., concur.
Ellis, C. J., and Terrell, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
Buford, J., dissents.
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Reinhold Ender v. Mercer, 150 Fla. 292 (Fla. 1942)…d of parties, and hence properly denied subsequent motion to vacate the order of dismissal and to reinstate the cause. Acts 1931, Ch. 14658, Sec. 70.” See Mayflower Investment Co. v. Brill et al., 131 Fla. 70, 178 Sou. 827; same case, 132 Fla. 530, 180 So. 754. It appears in this case, however, that the order dismissing the cause was inadvertently entered and was entered without notice when the cause was not subject to dismissal for want of prosecution. The record was then in such state that either party…
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State v. Jensen Rd. & Bridge Dist., 144 Fla. 442 (Fla. 1940)…tablished, pursuant to the provisions of Section 6 of Article IX of the Constitution, is without merit. This question was concluded contrary to the contention of the appellant by the decision of this Court in State v. City of Lakeland, 132 Fla. 489, 180 So. 754; State v. City of Clearwater, 125 Fla. 73, 169 So. 602; State v. City of West Palm Beach, 127 Fla. 849, 174 So. 334. See also State v. City of Auburndale, 144 Fla. 210, 197 So. 739. In the second question it is argued that where tolls from the oper…
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State v. City of Miami, 142 Fla. 284 (Fla. 1940)…e v. City of Miami, 103 Fla. 54, 137 So. 261; State v. City of Miami, 116 Fla. 517, 157 So. 13; Folks and State v. Marion County, 121 Fla. 17, 163 So. 925; State v. City of Orlando, 126 Fla. 251, 170 So. 887; State v. City of Lakeland, 132 Fla. 489, 180 So. 754. The form of the proposed refunding bonds prescribed in Resolution 15996 has been examined and found to contain proper and sufficient recitals as to both tire detached territory and as to the liability of all territory within the City for taxation…
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