ROYAL CROWN COLA CO.

v.

COCA-COLA CO. ET AL.

Citator

Cited By

• Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (U.S. 2010)
  …r that constitutes a break in Miranda custody. We have never decided whether incarceration constitutes custody for Miranda purposes, and have indeed explicitly declined to address the issue. See Perkins, 496 U. S., at 299. See also Bradley v. Ohio, 497 U. S. 1011, 1013 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Whether it does depends upon whether it exerts the coercive pressure that Miranda was designed to guard against — the “danger of coercion [that] results from the interaction of custo…
• Jones v. A.L. Lockhart, 977 F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1992)
  …xth Amendment (as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth), so as to justify setting aside the guilty plea and allowing a defendant to plead anew and go to trial. See Hill v. Lockhart, 894 F. 2d 1009, 1010 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1011, 110 S.Ct. 8268, 111 L.Ed.2d 767 (1990). It was after Hill came down that Jones’s counsel, at the time of the second appeal to this Court, first sought to raise the claim of misadvice before the guilty plea. Is this claim “novel”? We think not. The…
• Rogers v. United States, 990 F.2d 1008 (8th Cir. 1993)
  …1985); but see Hill v. Lockhart, 894 F. 2d 1009, 1010 (8th Cir.) (en banc) (attorney’s failure to correctly inform client about parole eligibility can amount to constitutional violation if it directly affects decision to plead guilty), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1011, 110 S.Ct. 3258, 111 L.Ed.2d 767 (1990). Rogers did not allege in his motion or in other pleadings before the district court that he would not have pleaded guilty if the trial court or his attorney had correctly informed him regarding parole eligi…