THELMA WOLPER, APPELLANT,
v.
MARSHALL I. WOLPER, APPELLEE
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In this divorce appeal, the wife challenged the trial court's award of lump-sum alimony rather than periodic payments, arguing the judge abused his discretion. The appellate court affirmed the lump-sum award, finding the chancellor properly exercised his discretion in determining the amount and form of alimony based on the totality of circumstances.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding lump-sum alimony. The chancellor properly exercised his discretion in selecting both the amount and terms of alimony, considering factors beyond merely the wife's needs and husband's ability to pay.
“the chancellor did not abuse his discretion when he selected the amount and terms of the alimony payable to the wife”
The court's central holding rejecting the wife's claim of abuse of discretion in the lump-sum alimony award.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant-wife filed for divorce and was awarded a final judgment granting the divorce and lump-sum alimony. The wife had enjoyed a high standard of l…
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Appellant-wife was the plaintiff below, having filed her complaint for divorce and other relief. Final judgment of divorce was entered in favor of the appellant, granting her the divorce and lump-sum alimony. She now contends that the chancellor erred in awarding the lump-sum alimony rather than periodic payments of alimony, and as grounds for this contention, she alleges generally that neither special circumstances nor peculiar equities were demonstrated to justify the lump-sum award. In particular, the wife calls our attention to the fact that she enjoyed a high standard of living before the divorce; that she requires psychiatric treatment for her emotional well-being; that the earnings of ap-pellee-husband are very high, and will continue to increase; and that her own personal capital assets would be depleted if she is required to maintain her standard of living without an increase in the chancellor’s award, or a modification of the alimony to periodic payments. Based on the above reasons, appellant contends that the chancellor abused his discretion. Gordon v. Gordon, Fla.App.1968, 204 So.2d 734.
Resisting the above contentions, appel-lee-husband urges that no abuse of discretion has been demonstrated. See Ortiz v. Ortiz, Fla.App.1968, 211 So.2d 243. In support of his position, the appellee has noted that the record demonstrates that no children were born of the marriage; that the wife had worked prior to the present marriage, and is gainfully employable; that the wife is of a relative young age; that her need for psychiatric treatment was uncorroborated; and that “other circumstances in the case” besides the wife’s needs and the husband’s ability to pay, may properly guide the chancellor in selecting the amount of alimony to be awarded. See *580Kahn v. Kahn, Fla.1955, 78 So.2d 367; Schultz v. Schultz, Fla.App. 1967, 197 So.2d 310; Whitehead v. Whitehead, Fla.App. 1966, 189 So.2d 397.
After a close examination of the record, we are convinced that the chancellor did not abuse his discretion when he selected the amount and terms of the alimony payable to the wife. Evidence and testimony was well presented by both parties, and the chancellor appears to have acted properly within the realm of discretion he enjoys in matters of setting alimony and other obligations in a divorce case. See especially, Milander v. Milander, Fla.App. 1968, 208 So.2d 876; Schultz v. Schultz, supra.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Talan v. Awilda E. Talan, 317 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)…t cannot be said that it rests upon an erroneous interpretation of one item of evidence. The awards made and the form in which they were made are well within the discretion allowed to a trial judge in such cases. See Wolper v. Wolper, Fla.App. 1969, 225 So. 2d 579. We have considered the other points presented in the briefs and find that none of them presented reversible error. Affirmed.…
Authorities Cited
- Kahn v. Kahn, 78 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1955)
- O'Dell v. Carlton B. O'Dell, 204 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)
- Ortiz v. Ortiz, 211 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- Milander v. Milander, 208 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- Whitehead v. Whitehead, 189 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966)
- Godesa Schultz v. Schultz, 197 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)